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ECHR – The European Convention on Human Rights 
Charter - Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
Community - The European Community 
Convention - The European Convention on Human Rights 
Whitehall - The British Government 
Holyrood - the Scottish Parliament 
Strasbourg - The european Court of Human Rights 
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Westminster - The British Parliament 
EC - The European Community 
EU -The European Union 
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1. Introduction 
 
Most constitutions were drafted after years of struggle and most often as a way to 
safeguard an individual’s rights against despotism, most often exercised by a king. Usually 
the constitution contained a bill of rights, which would set out these rights and control the 
power of the government.  
 
But if a constitution would be drafted today, how would it be done? Scotland has since 
1709 been a part of the United Kingdom, and was faced with this task after the devolution 
settlement was launched. A new constitution would be drafted in the light not only of UK 
law but also in accordance with the rights enshrined in the European Convention of Human 
Rights and the law and regulations made by the European Union. A framework, which 
could cope with the changes occurring in Europe, had to be set out and lines had to be 
drawn controlling the vires of the various legislating institutions. It is not only the king and 
the people anymore.  
 
Via the devolution settlement Scotland was to be given the power to control a large part of 
its affairs. In many cases this will be done in close co-operation with the government in 
London, which often has the power to veto legislation and decisions emanating from 
Edinburgh. 
 
This paper focuses on how rights can be enforced in Scotland. Scotland joins a small club 
of countries, which have taken the first step towards independence. It is therefore 
interesting to see how a legal system can operate when it has so many different parameters 
to consider. In this context it of particular interest too see how the courts apply the newly 
enacted legislation together with UK law so that the interpretation becomes coherent. 
 
 
1.1. Devolution 
 
The Scots have always regarded Scotland as a nation of its own, with its own culture and 
identity. They had for a long time worked towards more independence from London and 
after years of preparatory work the devolution1 settlement was finally launched. In the 
summer of 1999 the Scottish parliament in Edinburgh was inaugurated which was the most 
visible aspect of the devolution process.  
 
The main goal of the devolution settlement was to give Scotland a certain amount of 
independence from the government in London and to incorporate the European Convention 
on Human Rights2 in to the domestic Scottish law before it was done in the rest of the UK. 
This entailed a vast array of problems which had to be solved. First of all the scope of the 
devolution had to be set out in a practical way to decide which government should have the 
jurisdiction in what areas. The UK government had to remain in control in the most 
important areas according to Westminster traditions and due to practical aspects of 
                                                 
1 Devolution means the surrender of powers to local authorities by a central government.  
2 Also referred to as the ECHR or the Convention. 
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government. The line separating the jurisdiction between Westminster and Holyrood had to 
be clear to enable the devolution to work. Practitioners had to be able to know which laws 
to apply. This would be set out in the Scotland act, which is the main legal document for 
the devolution settlement. 
 
The Scotland Act does not only incorporate the ECHR but it also makes a direct reference 
to EC law and other international agreements, which provides for individual’s rights. The 
idea was to enable an individual to claim his basic rights at a local level, i.e. in a national 
Scottish court.  
 
The Scotland act comported that an individual could for the first time claim that his rights 
had been breached by the government based on the ECHR, the rights emanating from the 
EU and other international human rights instruments. This would also entail that the Scots 
could argue their cases before a national court instead of taking the case to Luxembourg or 
Strasbourg. 
 
One major difficulty was whether this development would be compatible with the present 
UK legislation. Problems was foreseen to arise concerning if the matter was devolved or 
not, i.e. if the case was under UK or Scottish jurisdiction. Therefore the Scotland act had to 
be constructed in way that it could deal with difficulties, which could arise during the 
initial stages of devolution.  
 
The devolution settlement had to be compatible with Westminster traditions as well, such 
as the supremacy of Parliament, the relationship to the EU and the question whether 
Scotland could become independent at all relating to the Act of Union from 1707 between 
Scotland and England.  
 
One very important aspect was how the new Scottish Parliament and the Scots would be 
able to take part in the legislation process in the UK and in the EU. This question works 
both ways; should Scottish representatives in Whitehall be able to take part in the 
legislation process for England when the English MPs cannot take part in Scotland?  
 
This paper aims to explain how the devolution process works in relation to the above-
mentioned problems. The analysis starts out by explaining the background to the 
devolution settlement and how the practical and jurisdictional issues between Whitehall 
and Holyrood are solved.  
 
Since the EC law and the ECHR directly affect the Scottish law, the analysis then moves to 
an international level where the two legal institutions are examined and how this 
relationship affects Scotland. When the Convention and Community law directly affects 
the national Scottish law, it is necessary to look at their relationship and how they affect 
each other. This relation and the evolving case law affect the legal process in Scotland 
since the EC law comports different solutions than the convention. 
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Finally, the paper examines the case law from the Scottish courts handling devolution 
issues and what the future might entail concerning inter alia the future changes in EC law 
dealing with basic rights. 
 
 
2. Historical background 
 
Great Britain is formed by England, Wales and Scotland, all with their own history and 
culture. Moreover, the United Kingdom contains England, Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. The British Isles consists of the United Kingdom and Ireland. Ireland is of course a 
separate country since 1921 but it still enjoys certain rights in the UK. Its nationals may 
inter alia vote and join the British army.3 
Furthermore there are the Channel Islands, which enjoy a quite independent position, with 
their own tax-laws, and the Crown colony Gibraltar. Moreover, the Commonwealth with 
its 49 members of which 17 have the Queen as their head of State, also play an important 
role for the United Kingdom. In this context it is easy to see the difficulties facing any 
attempt to change the constitution of Great Britain. 
 
In 1292 Edward I, King of England, conquered Scotland and brought the two countries 
under one ruler. The Scots liberated themselves after a few years of war, and realised that 
they needed an allied against their powerful neighbour to the south. Thus, Scotland and 
France, England’s sworn enemy, formed the “Auld Alliance” which lasted for more than 
200 years.4  
 
The first step towards some kind of unity between the two rivals Scotland and England was 
taken in 1603 when the Crowns where United. But even though both countries had the 
same royalty the conflicts remained.  
 
 
2.1. The Union 1707 
 
The next step towards a closer tie between Scotland and England was taken in 1707 when 
the parliaments were united. All Scottish matters were hence decided in Whitehall. The 
Scots were not satisfied with this arrangement and wanted to handle their own business on 
a local level. The general impression was that no one in Whitehall really cared much about 
Scotland. Further the Scots were ensured a minimum number of seats in the British 
Parliament and kept control over their universities, the church and most parts of the legal 
system. 
 
In 1885, a secretaryship for Scotland and the “Scottish Office” was established with 
responsibilities for education, health, poor law, fisheries, local government, police, prisons, 
roads and public work.5  
                                                 
3 Bratt, Christian, Thatcher och det nya facket, p 93. 
4 Zweigert, K, Kötz, H, An introduction to comparative law, p 202. 
5 Scotland’s Parliament, p 160. 
 8
This was the first step towards Scottish devolution but maybe more importantly, it was a 
way to ease the tension between Scottish nationalists and the government in London. The 
idea was to give some power to the Scots, which would hopefully keep them satisfied. 
Under the following years more power was transferred to Edinburgh and the Secretary of 
Scotland became a full Secretary of State in 1926 with his own office and more influence. 
 
The Scottish national party (SNP), struggling for an independent Scotland, became 
increasingly popular after the war and won a seat in Parliament in the Motherwell by-
election 1945. This was only the first victory for SNP and it would soon be followed by 
others. It also signalled to Whitehall that the Scots wanted more control over their country. 
But even though more power was transferred to Scotland, the idea of a Scottish regional 
parliament had already started to grow and gained increasingly more support amongst the 
Scots.  
Finally, on March 12 1974, the Queen gave a speech where she stated that discussions and 
negotiations concerning devolution for Scotland and Wales would be initiated.  
 
 
3.  A Brief Guide to Scots Law 
 
To understand the devolution settlement one must remember that there are several 
important differences between the Scottish and the English legal system. These differences 
still remain. The union of 1707 did not fully integrate the two legal systems. 
 
The Scottish civil law is based on more generalised rights and duties than the English. 
Scots law argues deductively from principles and still holds the distinction between legal 
process and substantive law. The influence of English law is however significant and 
although an English decision is not binding for a Scottish court it is persuasive especially if 
the decision interprets a United Kingdom Statute. 
 
Scots law, as such, does not appear until the 13th century even though many of its 
components can be traced to an earlier date. Scots lawyers studied in Europe due to the 
lack of universities in Scotland and were taught mostly Roman law. The influence from 
England at this time was remote due to the tense relation between the two countries who 
were in a constant state of conflict. Instead the French influence was stronger, due to the 
“Auld Alliance”, which meant that the Scottish law evolved in a different way.  
 
The structure of the judiciary began to take form in the 16th century. The faculty of 
advocates evolved and started their work at the courts.6 
 
In the late 17th century, Lord Stair, Lord president of the Court of Session and the first so 
called “institutional writer” published his first work “The institutions of the law of 
                                                 
6 The advocates still cherish the old traditions formed over the years. At the High Court in Edinburgh, the advocates still walk up and down the big 
hall briefing their clients. The procedure has the appearance of a ballroom dance but the real purpose is to let their private conversation drown in the 
sound of their footsteps on the parquet floor. 
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Scotland (1681)” where he set out the whole of Scots law as a rational, comprehensive and 
practical set of rules.7  
 
In 1707 the Parliaments of England and Scotland were united and gradually English law 
began to replace Roman law as the main extern source of influence since the majority of 
Scottish students now studied in England. The House of Lords became the final court of 
appeal for civil cases but the Scots kept their system for criminal cases. 
 
In the nineteenth century the English influence became even stronger. Especially through 
enactments from the British Parliament, the areas of private law, commercial law, 
economic law, administrative law and social law apply in Scotland and in England 
identically or alike.8 But the Scottish legal system still apply the works by the institutional 
writers especially Stair, Mackenzie, Erskine, and Bell.  
 
 
3.1. The Scottish court system 
 
Civil cases           Criminal Cases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Scottish civil cases are usually first tried before the Sheriff Courts in one of the six 
different sheriffdoms. The Court of Session in Edinburgh is the supreme civil court in 
                                                 
7 Zweigert, p 202. 
8 Zweigert, p 203. 
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Scotland and functions as a court of first instance and a court of appeal. An appeal from the 
court in civil cases lies to the House of Lords in London. 
The Court is divided into the Outer House and the Inner House. The Outer House consists 
of 19 Lords in ordinary sitting alone or in certain cases with a civil jury. They try cases at 
first instance on a wide range of civil matters, including tort and contract, commercial 
cases and judicial review.9 The Inner House is mainly an appeals court, though it has a 
small range of first instance cases. It is divided into the First and the Second Divisions, 
which are of equal authority and presided over by the principal judge, the Lord President, 
and the second in rank, the Lord Justice Clerk, respectively. 
 
The Sheriff Courts also handle most criminal cases except murder, rape, treason and 
piracy. These cases are directly under the jurisdiction of the High Court of Judiciary in 
Edinburgh, which also functions as an appeals court. The High Court is the highest 
instance in Scotland handling criminal cases.10 
 
Further the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg and the European Court of Human 
rights in Strasbourg are of significant importance, especially when it comes to providing 
case law and as the final appeals court in cases within their jurisdiction. 
 
The Privy Council in London is also of importance since it is final arbitrator of devolution 
issues. The Privy Council normally deals with question of law within the Commonwealth 
but has since devolution increased its jurisdiction. The Council does not normally deal with 
any cases involving domestic UK law. 
 
 
4. British Constitutional traditions 
 
Before the discussion could start concerning the scope of devolution there where a number 
of constitutional hurdles which had to be overcome. The status of the Scotland act had to 
be decided in the light of the constitutional traditions which had been formed over the 
years at Westminster. 
 
 
4.1 The principle of sovereignty of Parliament 
 
One of the key principles in the UK constitutional tradition is the principle of sovereignty 
of parliament.11 The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty means that an Act of Parliament 
can modify or repeal any previous Act without being in any way bound by its previous 
legislation. The British Parliament is legislative omnipotent, which means that no law 
made by it can be challenged. Further, the Parliament is never bound by a previous 
                                                 
9 www.scotcourts.gov.uk/session/session. 
10 http://www.law.gla.ac.uk/scot_guide/COURTS.HTML. 
11 Also called parliamentary supremacy or supremacy of Parliament. 
 11
decision. This is probably the main factor why Britain has no written constitution and no 
charter of rights.12 
 
 
4.2. The Union Act 1707 
 
Ever since the Union between Scotland and England was formed and the state of Great 
Britain came to being the 1 May 1707 there has been a debate concerning the constitutional 
value of the Union Act.13 The act set out the conditions for the Union and inter alia how 
the two sovereign countries would be represented in the new Parliament. The discussion 
concerned whether the Act had any special constitutional value or if it was merely a law 
like any other.  
If the Union Act was entrenched in any way, this would contravene the principle of 
sovereignty of parliament, which has been one of the cornerstones in the history of the 
Parliament. It would also mean that the changes made under the devolution settlement 
would be outside the competence of the UK parliament since the act stated that it should 
apply for all time. Lord Grey who had challenged the competence of the parliament in 
relation to the Union act argued that the Parliament was bound by the act and could not 
change it. This would in the long run mean that Britain had a written entrenched 
constitution and that no Scottish Parliament could be formed. 
The judicial committee of the House of Lords tried the case and found that the Union Act 
was not entrenched in any way. The Union act had inter alia no mechanism for amending 
the paragraphs, which normally is a significant feature of a constitution. Further, the Union 
Act had also been fundamentally disregarded over the years. Thus the ruling states that 
Britain has no written constitution and that the Parliament still is sovereign.  
 
 
4.3. The European Communities Act 
 
One constitutional issue which had to be solved was the question whether the UK 
Parliament could give away some of its power to Scotland since this would contravene the 
principle of sovereignty of Parliament. This issue was however not a new one. When 
Britain entered the European Union the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty had to be 
modified because under Community law all national laws are subject to Community rules. 
The answer given to this theoretical problem was that, in theory, Britain could repeal the 
act that set out the adherence to the Community14, and thus leave the Union.  
 
When Britain adheres to an ECJ decision she does so, simply because she has agreed to do 
so on a voluntary basis. In the case Macarthy’s Ltd v. Smith, Lord Denning stated that if 
the case should occur when parliament deliberately passes an act with the intent of 
repudiating the treaty or any provision in it the court would have the duty to follow it.15  
                                                 
12 Nergelius, Joakim, Konstitutionellt rättighetsskydd, svensk rätt i ett komparativt perspektiv, p 342.  
13 Monroe, Colin R, The Hume papers on public policy 1997, The Union of 1707 and the British Constitution, p 87. 
14 1972 European Communities Act 
15 Macarthy’s Ltd v.Smith, 1979 All E.R 325. 
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However, in the case Factortame the House of Lords followed an ECJ decision, which 
overruled a British act.16 The ruling clarified to some extent the UK position towards 
Community law and strengthened the Community’s legislation in Britain. 
It is interesting to see how the Parliament dealt with the supremacy of parliament principle, 
especially when it comes to the fact that EC law will override national law. The answer 
was however simple. The UK concedes on a voluntary basis.17 
 
 
4.4. The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty today 
 
The Doctrine is disputed and considered to be slightly obsolete.18 The Doctrine entails that 
there is no UK legislation which is technically entrenched and it would be possible to 
repeal the European Communities Act 1972 which took Britain into the European 
Community. However, this would in, practise, be very difficult. The same goes for the 
incorporation of the European Convention on Human rights and the devolution legislation. 
The European Court of Justice and the Human rights Court are becoming increasingly 
important and Devolution gives the domestic courts the possibility to scrutinise laws and 
actions by the Parliament and the Government. In Scotland it will become even more 
difficult for the UK Parliament to intervene since there has been a referendum and the 
Scottish Parliament has begun to legislate on its own. However, it must be borne in mind 
that the UK parliament has by no means devolved all its powers to any of the above 
mentioned.19 
 
According to the legal reasoning the UK parliament is still in control, in line with the 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty. In reality Scotland has the real power based on the 
fact that it would be politically impossible for the UK Parliament to overrule a major 
Scottish act. However it is interesting to see how the legislature dealt with the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty. The principle does not hinder the devolution process but it 
influences all legislation. 
 
 
5.  The Process of Devolution  
 
There is an ever-present fear in England that the Union might be dissolved and that 
Scotland will become an independent country. A strategy to prevent this is to give Scotland 
as much power as it needs to function efficiently, but without granting it independence. It 
is prudent for the Government in London to stay ahead of the nationalists by giving them 
what they want instead of being forced into something worse. Many Scots believe that they 
will manage on their own and that they have no real benefits in being a part of the UK. In 
view of the growing importance of the EU, it is not as vital to be a part of the UK any 
                                                 
16 C-221/89 Factortame, p 3905. 
17 It is interesting to compare this statement with the similar approach by the German court in the solange case, se further section 9.1.2. 
18 Hazell, Robert, The new Constitutional settlement, constitutional futures, p 185. 
19 Similar provisions have been made throughout Europe by inter alia Germany in the Brunner case (solange) as a political statement as a safeguard 
against the ECJ. 
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longer. Nato and WEU can give the necessary protection and the WTO and the EU 
provides the necessary trading partners. The need to belong to Britain is not as strong as it 
was. 
 
5.1 The first referendum 1979 
 
After a long and agitated debate the first devolution bill was passed through the House of 
Lords and a date was set for a referendum. However during the reading in the House of 
Commons the so called Cunningham rule was amended, which entailed that at least 40% of 
the persons entitled to vote must vote in favour for devolution. If not, the whole act would 
automatically be repealed.    
The referendum was held 1 March. Of those who voted 51.6% voted "Yes" but they only 
consisted 32.9% of the total electorate. The Act was thus repealed since it did not meet the 
requirements of the Cunningham rule. 
 
For some this was seen as a major setback for Scottish devolution but it was also a 
valuable lesson for those involved, an experience that would prove to be useful later on. 
 
After the setback in the 1979 referendum things went back to "normal". The Scottish 
Office in Edinburgh handled most of the important issues for Scotland, but if one scratched 
the surface, the ideas of a Scottish Parliament were still there.  
 
After the Tory years, with Margaret Thatcher and later on John Mayor, the urge for 
devolution amongst the Scots peaked. The conservative party has never been very strong in 
Scotland and after the Poll tax tests their support hit rock bottom. Labour presented a 
manifest for the upcoming election in July 1997, where they pledged to modernise British 
politics by decentralising the power and thus to form regional parliaments. After the 
election, which labours won, a White paper was presented which laid out the key elements 
for New Britain. Regional Parliaments would be created after referendums in Scotland and 
Wales. Britain would also incorporate the European convention on Human rights into UK 
law. The white Paper also contained several other proposals on how to modernise British 
government inter alia the removal of hereditary peers in the House of Lords. 
 
 
5.2. Devolution throughout the United Kingdom 
 
Devolution in other parts of Britain also played an important role. Wales would be given 
the opportunity to have an Assembly but with less power than the Scottish Parliament. The 
Welsh are more tied to England than Scotland is and they have not been as interested in 
devolution as the Scots have been. The different regions in England would be given more 
power and there would be a Mayor in London. An assembly would also be created in 
Northern Ireland with the idea that this also might help the peace process. The White Paper 
states the belief that the union will be strengthened by recognising the claims of Scotland, 
Wales and the different regions in England with strong identities of their own. Devolution 
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will thus not only safeguard the union but also enhance it. Some critics believe that parts of 
the regional devolution plans are just a way to cover and smoothen out the Scottish 
devolution. Especially the formation of somewhat artificial regions in England has been 
criticised. 
 
 
5.3. The white paper 1997 
 
Scotland would be given the most devolved power amongst the regions in the UK. The 
White Paper set out the necessary framework and showed the determination of the 
Government to proceed with the constitutional reform. The White Paper was based the 
Scottish Office’s existing powers which would be used as the basis from which the 
devolution boundaries would be negotiated with Whitehall.  
 
The White paper "Scotland's Parliament" was published on 24 July 1997, and set out all the 
key principles on how the new parliament would work and its relation to Whitehall. There 
would be a Scottish Parliament and a Scottish Executive with a First Minister. The 
responsibilities would be roughly the same as before devolution but now the Scots would 
have the power to legislate themselves without having to take a detour over London. 
It was very helpful for the devolution process that the Scottish Office already had some 
powers and the experience of dealing with governmental matters. The Office and the 
Secretary of state for Scotland, Mr Donald Dewar, represented the devolved Scotland and 
prepared it for the first election. After heated discussions between Whitehall and 
representatives from Scotland, the Scotland Act was finally drafted. 
 
 
5.4. The second referendum 1997 
 
The Scotland act was drafted surprisingly quickly based on negotiations, previous 
experiences, and, of course, the White Paper. 20 Voters in Scotland voted on the proposals 
in a referendum on 11 September 1997, only three months after the White Paper was 
published, and gave their opinion on the two questions whether there would be a Scottish 
Parliament and whether it would have tax-varying powers. 74% of the voters answered yes 
to the first question, and 63% answered yes to the second question. The Scotland act 
received Royal Assent on 19 November 1998 after being passed through Parliament. 
 
 
6.  The Scotland act 
 
The Scotland act is the main document setting out the devolution process. The Act contains 
6 parts which set out the establishment of the Scottish Parliament and its powers, the 
                                                 
20 Many believe that the preparatory work leading to devolution could be drafted so quickly because the Scottish had kept the idea of devolution alive 
and thus where better prepared to handle the issues. 
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Scottish administration, financial provisions, the Tax-Varying power and finally a 
miscellaneous and a supplementary section. The Act covers a wide range of issues. The 
most important are the jurisdictional limits, the vires, of the Scottish Parliament, and the 
incorporation of the Convention. 
 
The Scotland act lacks one feature which is usually significant for as constitutional 
document, it is not entrenched in any legal way. Thus it can be repealed as any other law 
by the UK parliament. However, the act enjoys a special status per se due to its content. To 
repeal the Act would be politically impossible without great public support. This 
construction is a result of the need to be compatible with the principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty. 
 
        6.1. The scope of devolution 
 
Sections 28-36 are in some respects the heart of the Act. They set out the Parliament’s 
legislative powers and thus what is devolved and what is reserved. The key principle is that 
there is a presumption that all matters, which are not reserved, shall be seen as devolved.. 
Schedule 5 of the Scotland Act sets out a list of those areas of government, which are 
reserved, based on the White Paper. Schedule 5 has two parts where the first sets out 
general reservations and the second sets out specific areas where the UK Parliament wants 
to keep the control. 
 
One of the biggest problems that had to be solved was how to decide on which areas the 
new Parliament in Edinburgh would legislate, and which would remain in London. To 
make devolution work as smoothly as possible the White Paper expressly states that all 
matters not specifically reserved will be devolved.21 There is thus a presumption that all 
matters not covered in the Scotland Act as being reserved are within the competence of the 
Scottish Parliament.22 This was one of the lessons from the 1978 Act, which probably was 
too specific for its own good.  
 
 
6.1.1 Reserved areas 
 
Westminster retained powers23 
Abortion 
Broadcasting policy 
Civil service 
Common markets for UK goods and services 
Constitution 
Electricity, coal, oil, gas, nuclear energy 
Defence and national security 
                                                 
21 White paper, Shaping Scotland’s Parliament. Sect. 2.4. 
22 White Paper,  p 35. 
23 www.news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/special_report/1999/06/99/scottish_parliament_opening 
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Drug policy 
Employment 
Foreign policy and relations with Europe 
Most aspects of transport safety and regulation 
National lottery 
Political parties and their registration and funding 
Protection of borders 
Social security 
Stability of UK's fiscal, economic and monetary system 
 
 
6.1.2 Devolved areas 
 
The Scottish Parliament Powers, albeit not expressly stated in the act, are thus. 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry 
Economic development 
Education 
Environment 
Food standards 
Health 
Home affairs 
Law-Courts, police, fire services   
Local Government 
Sport and the Arts 
Transport 
Training 
Tourism 
Research and statistics 
Social work 
 
The list of reserved matters is very general and gives room for interpretation. The general 
principle is clear but as the White Paper sets out, there is also a need for a mechanism for 
adjusting the list of reserved matters as appropriate and as the need arises. This wish is 
fulfilled in the act by stating that an order under this section would need to be approved by 
both houses of the UK Parliament and by the Scottish Parliament.24 Furthermore the 
Scottish Parliament can debate any issue regardless if it is devolved or not. 
 
The Act further specifies the powers which are reserved to the UK Parliament including 
the constitution of the United Kingdom.25 This includes all matters dealing with the Union 
between Scotland and England, the Crown and the structure of the highest Courts of 
Appeal in Scotland. 
 
                                                 
24 Scotland Act, Section 30. 
25 Scotland Act, part 1, Schedule 5. 
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The registration and funding of political parties is further a reserved matter, which again 
indicates that London wants to control the most fundamental issues. Foreign affairs, 
international relations with territories outside the UK thus including the European Union 
and other international institutions are reserved. The civil service of the State is also 
reserved. 
 
 
        6.2. Legislative competence 
 
The two most important sections of the Scotland act stating the competence of the Scottish 
Parliament and the Executive are section 29 and section 57. They set out the vires of all 
legislation and the vires of the acts mad by a member of the Scottish Executive. 
 
6.2.1. Section 29 of the Scotland Act 
 
Section 29 of the Scotland Act sets out the legislative competence of the Parliament.26 Any 
provisions relating to reserved matters are outside its competence, thus ultra vires, and is 
not considered as good law. The same applies to any provision which is incompatible with 
any Convention right or Community Law.  
 
This section fulfils the commitment to incorporate the European convention on Human 
Rights into Scots Law via the Human rights Act and nullifies any law contravening that 
act. Any Scottish legislation contravening Community Law will also, in the same way, be 
nullified. 
 
The UK government is responsible for the relations with the European Community being 
the actual member state. The Scottish Executive will however be able to play a role 
alongside the UK government in forming a British policy. Scotland will also have 
responsibility for observing and implementing Community obligations in so far as they 
relate to devolved matters. 
 
 
6.2.2. Section 57 of the Scotland Act 
 
All legislation passed by the Scottish parliament is in a UK context viewed as subordinate 
legislation. Section 57 states that a member of the Scottish Executive has no power to 
make any subordinate legislation, or to act, in a way which is incompatible with any of the 
Convention rights or with Community law.27 This entails that any act of a member of the 
Scottish Executive is void if it contravenes the European Convention on Human Rights. 
This also applies to any breach of Community Law. 
                                                 
26 See appendix. 
27 See appendix. 
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The Section has been criticised for being unclear relating to the definition of an “act” and 
whether it encompasses a failure to act. Arguments have been made that only positive 
breaches would be considered under the Scotland Act. This is however very unlikely and it 
is probably safe to say that Section 57(2) includes a failure to act.28  
 
Section 57 refers directly to the act made by a member of the Scottish Executive.29 This 
statement also includes all personnel carrying out functions under the actual ministers 
department. This entails that e.g. all judges and prosecutors are bound by the Section since 
they are appointed by the Lord Advocate who is the Scottish minister of justice. 
 
The consequences are thus harsh. It is therefore very important for the executive to 
scrutinise all its procedures and bills to make certain that they are compatible. This is 
however a very difficult task since the Convention now is part of the Scottish law which 
gives the Scottish courts the opportunity to build up a case law of its own which might 
differ from Strasbourg. The Scottish ECHR case Law might also evolve faster since it only 
deals with Scottish problems. 
 
        6.3. Deciding the scope of devolution 
 
There are procedures for safeguarding that no laws passed by the Scottish Parliament are 
ultra vires. A member of the Executive responsible for the actual Bill must before 
introduction, state that it is compatible i.e. intra vires.30 The same procedure applies to the 
Presiding Officer who must decide whether or not the bill is within the Parliaments 
legislative competence. The Presiding Officer has his own staff of legal advisers who will 
scrutinise the Bill.  
 
At this stage of the introduction of a Bill there is a possibility during four weeks for The 
Advocate General, the Lord Advocate or the Attorney General to interfere if they consider 
the Bill to be ultra vires. 31 It is then within their power to refer the question to the Judicial 
Committee which will rule on the question. The same time limits apply to intervention 
regarding national security, international obligations or defence.  
 
 
6.3.1. The Judicial committee of the Privy Council 
 
The Law Lords in the Judicial Committee of Privy Council in London sits as the final 
arbitrator deciding on the scope of the devolution settlement. If the two governments 
cannot amicably decide the boundaries of devolution the question will be solved by the 
                                                 
28 Statement by Lord Coulsfield in the Case Paul Clancy v Robin Dempsey Caird, p 32 where he argues that that conclusion would frustrate the 
whole framework provided by the Scotland Act. 
29 Scotland Act, Section 44. 
30 Scotland Act, Section 31. 
31 The Lord Advocate is the main Scottish law officer whereas the Advocate General is the UK legal representative in Scotland. The Attorney 
General is also a UK legal official but based in London. 
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court in London. The Privy Council may also hear a case concerning a devolution issue on 
appeal from the Scottish higher courts or from the House of Lords.32 
 
This entails that the Privy Council can rule on a criminal matter which involves a 
devolution issue. Prior to the Scotland act this was not possible since all criminal matters 
were purely of Scottish concern. 
 
 
        6.4. UK possibilities to intervene in the process of legislation in 
Scotland 
 
Even though the Scottish Parliament and the Executive will have a considerable degree of 
autonomy, Scotland will remain an integral part of the United Kingdom. The White Paper 
sets out that the Executive shall keep in close touch with Departments of the UK 
government.33 The principle is that most matters should be dealt with through officials of 
the Departments in question if it is not necessary to negotiate on a higher level. 
  
The UK Government has the power to intervene in the devolved areas in certain cases 
primarily involving matters dealing with international obligations, defence or national 
security.34 Furthermore it is clear that the Scottish Executive and the UK Government may 
from time to time take different views of the Scottish Parliament's legislative powers. As 
mentioned above, the primary principle is that these matters shall be resolved by officials 
in a constructive and amicable atmosphere.35 
 
6.4.2. UK overriding legislation 
 
There are thus several ways for the UK government to interfere during the process of law 
making in Scotland to make sure that the Scottish Executive has acted within its 
competence. There is however always the possibility for the UK Parliament to interfere by 
legislating a law which overrules a Scottish Act. The Scotland Act states that the UK 
parliament's power to legislate for Scotland is unaffected by devolution.36 This entails that 
there is a possibility that the two parliaments can legislate on the same matter. This leads to 
a theoretical ”Ping-Pong” effect, where one Parliament could repeal the other Parliament’s 
Act by an act of its own, and so on. The risk for this to happen is remote since the political 
price would be too high. This clause is a safeguard for the principle of the supremacy of 
Parliament but also a way for Whitehall to interfere if need be e.g. when implementing 
European directives. This section is also important for the UK, which can interfere in 
matters relating to other international relations or its defence or national security. Thus the 
UK parliament is in power but it gives away some of its power by its own free will while 
                                                 
32 www.privy-council.org.uk/judicial-committee/2000/jurisdiction.htm. 
33 White paper,  para 4.12-4.14. 
34 Scotland Act,  Section 35-58. 
35 White paper,  para 4.15. 
36 Scotland Act, Section 28(7)  
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reserving the possibility to act if need be. The similarity in the legal reasoning compared to 
the European communities act is evident. 
 
There is a general reservation of European matters to the United Kingdom authorities with 
the consequent limitations that this might impose on devolved matters. The devolved 
institutions are required to act within the bounds of Community law and the legal 
consequences for not complying accordingly can be that the act will be ultra vires. 
 
Whitehall also has the opportunity to legislate for Scotland when it concerns Community 
Law. The main rule is that Scotland should implement European legislation, such as 
directives, by itself but Whitehall has the possibility to interfere if The Scottish Executive 
has not done so in time.  
 
        6.5. Scottish representation in the UK Parliament 
 
There are not only difficulties with deciding the scope of devolution but also with its 
implications at Westminster. There are still UK elections which entails that Scotland has its 
own constituencies and thus representation at UK Parliament. Since the Union Act was 
found not to be binding the former fixed minimum number of Scottish MPs was 
removed.37 The Scots would instead be represented at Westminster by the direct outcome 
of the elections. 
 
 
6.5.1. The West Lothian Question 
 
The question has arisen whether the Scottish Members of Parliament should be entitled to 
legislate on English matters when the English MPs cannot legislate for Scotland. This issue 
is called the West Lothian question and is still a dilemma. If the Scottish MPs should 
decide only on pure Scottish matters it would probably just make things more difficult. 
Furthermore it would entail that there would be an incitement for giving the Scottish 
Parliament more powers. This would not enhance the Union. Today there are only two 
solutions to the problem, no representation at all “or in and out”. The latter solution would 
mean that Scottish MPs should deal only with Scottish reserved matters and leave the room 
when pure english matters are dealt with. However neither of these solutions are 
workable.38 Another suggestion is to decrease the number of Scottish representatives at 
Westminster. The first step in this direction has already been taken by removing the fixed 
number of representatives in both Houses. Today there is a higher percentage of Scottish 
MPs in Westminster than there are English. This means that the minimum number of 
representatives once decided in the Act of Union from 1707 in reality is somewhat 
obsolete. Nevertheless this is a tricky question which will not be easily solved since similar 
questions will arise concerning Wales and Northern Ireland.  
 
                                                 
37 Scotland Act, Section 86. 
38 Scotland’s parliament, fundaments for a new Scotland Act, p 108. 
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6.5.2 Scottish Grand Committee 
 
On 29 February 1999, the first meeting of the Scottish Grand Committee (SGC) took place 
in London. The SGC gives the Scottish MPs the opportunity to discuss pure Scottish 
questions which are not devolved or which are of concern in Scotland. The committee has 
no power to make any parliamentary decisions but its creation makes it possible for the 
Scottish MPs to take a common approach in many issues. There is no similar body 
concerning only English matters. 
 
The reason for creating the SGC was also that this would give the Scots a better possibility 
to affect legislation in the reserved areas. This would entail that the differences between 
what is devolved and what is not should not be so significant.  
 
 
 
7. Scotland and the European Union 
 
Scotland has an interesting position within the EU. A small country within one of the 
largest and most influential member states. Scotland has been bound be EC legislation 
since the UK joined the Community.Thus, the Scotland act, implementing EC law, did not 
change the validity of EC law in Scotland. The Scotland act did, however, put focus on the 
fact that Scotland has to adhere to community law. 
 
7.1. The Doctrine of direct effect 
 
The European Union plays a key role for all the European countries. The field of 
Community law is constantly growing and the legislation emanating from Brussels can 
strike out national legislation under the doctrine of direct effect.39 This means that EC law 
will strike out both primary and secondary legislation in Scotland. This stance is also 
explicitly stated in the Scotland act which entails that no law or act made by Scottish 
officials may contravene Community legislation.40 The impact of Community law in 
Scotland is thus significant and it is one of the most important aspects that have to be 
closely followed by the Scottish legislators. Community law has played an important role 
in Scotland since the UK joined the Union. Thus the changes would not be as great as the 
incorporation of the Convention. 
 
One of the difficulties facing Scotland is how it will make its voice heard in Brussels.  
 
 
7.2. How Scotland can affect EC legislation 
 
                                                 
39 See the evolution starting with Van Gend C-26/62, and Costa ENEL C-6/64. 
40 Scotland act, section 29 and 57. 
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Whitehall wanted to keep a British uniform "line" in Brussels. This means that all issues 
concerning Community Law must pass via Whitehall. This has created a need to co-
ordinate policy making at an intra-ministerial level to ensure that the United Kingdom line 
reflects the needs of the United Kingdom as a whole. Thus it is vital to maintain good 
relations between government officials at all levels so that problems arising underway 
easily and efficiently can be solved. 
 
Since Devolution started a number of bodies and committees have been introduced to 
create an efficient and solid framework on how to co-operate and communicate. A 
memorandum of understanding and four concordats on, the handling of EU business, 
International relations; financial assistance to industry; and statistics were published 
simultaneously in Edinburgh, London and Cardiff on October 1 1999.41 The purpose was 
to cover areas of administration where it would be sound to have a common approach. 
They are not legally binding but there is a clear dicta that they will be observed by all 
parties. 
 
The memorandum of understanding also provides for the establishment of a joint 
Ministerial Committee, a forum where the Ministers of the UK Government and the 
Devolved administrations can meet to consult each other. The JMC has no decision-
making power but it is a clear expectation that its position in different matters will be 
supported. The JMC can discuss virtually any question, especially concerning the thin grey 
line dividing the devolved and the reserved areas. The idea is to have a body which can 
deal with all the issues which might cause tension and problems between the different 
devolved administration and Whitehall.  
 
 
7.3. Scotland’s accessibility to Brussels 
 
Scotland is just one of several players in Brussels and, as a region in the UK, it makes its 
voice heard via the UK delegation. It becomes slightly difficult when the Scottish 
Parliament and the Executive has to implement and follow community law without the 
possibility to challenge the validity of the Community acts alone.42 The only way to do so 
is via the UK. This adds to the difficulty to access the European court of Justice in matters 
that are important for Scotland since all cases will first be scrutinised by Whitehall. This 
problem is however present in all countries in one way ore another, the problem here is that 
this might support the Scottish nationalists and their opinion that Scottish matters are not as 
important to Whitehall as the English. Hence this would call for more devolution.  
It is important to the regional level of government that it is able to protect its own interests 
and prerogatives against encroachment by the European authorities. Even if the United 
Kingdom position is specifically "Scotland friendly" there is no guarantee that the United 
Kingdom line will ultimately be adopted by the Council of Ministers. More often than not 
decisions taken at European level are compromises between the views of all the Member 
states and trade-offs are made routinely to protect a number of vital interests. 
                                                 
41 www.scottishsecretary.gov.uk/SAC_%20memorandum%2029.03htm 
42 Under article 230 of the EC Treaty. 
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Moreover the construction is rather fragile. Almost every governmental department deals 
with European law in one way ore another and it is difficult to know where to draw the 
line. To make devolution efficient it was decided to have a rather loose structure and to let 
the problems be solved by close co-operation. But difficulties will arise in deciding if an 
act is within the scope of the Scotland Act. Such difficulties will also occur when the 
Scottish law differs from the English law. European matters is a reserved area but with the 
ongoing evolution in Community law this will be a part of the devolution settlement that 
must be revised in the near future. Apart from forming action committees handling the co-
operation between the Parliaments, different measures have been taken to give the Scottish 
Parliament the opportunity to scrutinise EC documentation the same way as Westminster. 
This is primarily done by the European committee which will take a lead role in examining 
how EC legislation will impact in Scotland.  
 
Scotland has quite recently opened "Scotland House" to promote Scotland in Brussels. For 
some, it might give the impression that it is a start for a more active Scottish policy 
towards Brussels, but in fact it is difficult to say at this stage what difference such 
representation it will make. Westminster however, supports a Scottish representation, 
maybe just because it does not really interfere with the “British” line. Several regions have 
their own "houses" in Brussels. A permanent representation has been seen as necessary to 
promote the region especially to attract the structural funds. But there is no real proof that 
such representation actually makes any difference. 
Looking at the present structure of the Community it is clear that it will be difficult for 
Scotland to make its voice heard in Brussels. Here it will be more interesting to go via 
London.  
 
 
7.4. Scotland’s status in the EU 
 
Scotland’s present status within the European Union is rather unclear. The European Union 
has for a long time promoted regional democracy and regional governing under the 
principle of subsidiary. However this has been done in so many different ways throughout 
Europe that one has so far not been able to find a unitary system for how it should work. 
This is mainly because it is up to the Member States to decide how they want to govern 
their territory. There are European institutions where the different regions can make their 
voices heard, such as the Committee of the Regions, the Association of European Border 
Regions, The Assembly of European Regions, the Association of regions with traditional 
industry, and the Association of frontier Regionas.43  
 
 
7.5. The status of regional governments in Community law 
 
The European Court of Justice has not ruled on the status of regional governments. In the 
few cases dealing with the subject the Court has so far managed to avoid the question. 
                                                 
43 Nugent, Neill, The Government and Politics of the European Union, p 243. 
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Advocate General Lentz has however raised the question directly in his opinion in 
Wallonia v Commission where he stated that the region of Wallonia was a non-privileged 
applicant. Advocate Lentz argued that the Regional Executive was an organ under the state 
and despite the fact that it was vested with sovereign powers it could not be regarded as a 
Member State for the purposes of article 230.  
This entails that the Regional Executive will be in the same position as any legal or natural 
person within the union. 
 
The Commission does not really make the situation any easier for the parties since it tends 
to co-operate with nations, regions or communities depending on the matter in question. 
Thus there is no fix scheme. Scotland will therefore work with the Commission when it is 
preferable rather than just because the matter involves the region. 
 
There is also another very difficult question for Brussels to solve. The European Union 
does not want to interfere in the member states internal affairs. It is not up to Brussels to 
decide which constitutional status Scotland should have.44  
 
 
7.6. Concluding remarks 
 
The only way for Scotland to affect EC legislation is via London. The UK, being one of 
the larger EU countries, has a large influence in Brussels and Scotland has probably a 
bigger chance to affect the legislation process through the UK parliament than by its own.  
 
Even though the doctrine of direct effect applies in Scotland, the Scotland Act contains a 
direct reference to EC law stating that all Scottish legislation must comply with EC law. 
Otherwise it will be considered as ultra vires. The procedural differences between UK 
legislation and Scottish legislation are thus remote. 
 
 
 
8.  Scotland and the European Convention on Human 
Rights 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights was drafted in the aftermath of the Second 
World War. It originally focused on the issues which were seen to have contributed to the 
collapse of democracy in Europe during the 1930s and the growing threat of Soviet 
influence in Eastern Europe. The Convention thus focused mainly on civil and political 
rights and excluded social, economic and cultural rights. The idea was to create an 
enforceable list of human rights, which all parties to the Convention were obliged to secure 
to persons within their jurisdiction. The Convention came into force in 1953 when it was 
adapted by the Council of Europe. It was a radical measure for its time when it had a 
                                                 
44 However if a country within the EU would split up this would create immense problems, specially relating to their representation in Brussels and 
the subsequent question how many votes they should be given. 
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practical effect with its to main bodies- The European Commission of human rights and the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Committee of Ministers.45 
 
Moreover the Convention provided the possibility for individuals to bring complaints of 
Human Rights violations before the Commission. However this was not compulsory. The 
idea was rather to let the member states decide whether they would allow individual 
application or not. Similarly, the jurisdiction of the Court of Human rights had to be 
recognised on a voluntary basis.  
 
Matters regarded as fundamental human rights have evolved and cover a broader spectrum 
today than fifty years ago. The Convention has been able to grow via eleven additional 
protocols, which the Member states can ratify. All states in Europe have different attitudes 
and policies towards Human Rights depending on their current situation. This system 
makes it possible for the Member State to adapt or reject the obligations in these protocols, 
while being bound by the basic rights set out in the Convention.   
 
From 1980 and onwards, the court faced an increased growth in the number of cases before 
it, which meant that it had difficulties in keeping the length of the proceedings within 
reasonable time limits.46 After the accession of new Contracting States in 1990 the need for 
a reform was obvious. On 1 November 1998 the new European Court of Human Rights 
was set up. The new court consists of four sections with a staff of currently 41 full-time 
judges elected by the Council of Europe. 
 
The United Kingdom ratified the Convention in 1951, albeit it did not recognise the right 
of individual application until 1966, and then only temporarily. Since the Convention never 
was incorporated into UK law it has only been possible for the applicants to take their case 
to Strasbourg, an expensive procedure which takes a very long time. Therefore the Labour 
Party proposed to incorporate the Convention into UK law so that British courts could 
handle the cases.47 This would also give the Courts the possibility to build up their own 
case law and to interpret the Convention focusing on British matters.  
 
 
8.1. Human rights law in Scotland before devolution 
 
Before the Human rights act and the Scotland Act the legislative conformity or non-
conformity with the Convention was stated in a principle set out in Brind.48 The principle 
basically stated that all ambiguous legislation should be presumed to be in conformity with 
the Convention. Ambiguous legislation should be read in the light of the Convention so 
that the legislation itself would conform to it.49 This interpretation applied only to England 
and Whales. In Kaur50, Lord Ross concluded that the principle in Brind was not applicable 
                                                 
45 The United Nations adapted the universal declaration on human rights in 1948, which did not have the binding force of a treaty nor any means by 
which it could be enforced until 1966. 
46 www.echr.coe.int/infodocrevised2. p2. 
47 Bringing rights home, labours plan to incorporate.... 
48 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind, 1991 1 A.C. 696. 
49 The principle was clearly stated by Lord President Hope in T, Petitioner  1997 S.L.T.724 (at734) 
50 Surjit Kaur v Lord Advocate, 1981 SLT 322. 
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in Scotland. This approach was however later on reversed in the case T Petitioner51 where 
Lord Hope stated that the Court in fact should interpret legislation in conformity with the 
Convention.52 
 
8.2. The Human Rights Act 1998 
 
The decision was made to incorporate the Convention through national legislation, the 
Human rights Act 1998, which was brought into force in October 2000 throughout Britain. 
Its general provisions are to ensure that all Westminster legislation will be interpreted in a 
way which is compatible with the Convention rights, as far as it is possible. Scotland 
would start applying the act at the same time they inaugurated their parliament. 
The Human Rights Act affects all Westminster legislation and thus all reserved matters. 
The Act enjoys a special status since it is used to interpret all other legislation. 
 
The Human rights act does not fully and unconditionally incorporate the Convention. The 
act states that a court or tribunal dealing with a question involving a convention right must 
only “take into account” decisions and judgements from the European Court of Human 
Rights.53 In this context it is also worth notifying that the long title to the act, which 
summarises its contents starts out “an act to give further effect to rights and freedoms 
guaranteed under the European Convention…” Thus the courts are not bound to follow the 
jurisprudence from Strasbourg. However this approach should not be seen as a way to 
avoid the full consequences of an implementation, but more as a way to safeguard the 
sovereignty of Parliament. There is always the possibility to take the case to Strasbourg 
when the UK under international law is under the obligation to abide by its final 
judgement.54 If it is not possible for the court to interpret UK legislation in a way so it 
complies with the Convention, the Court cannot quash that legislation. Instead it is up to 
the UK Parliament to remedy that inconsistency by new legislation.55  
 
8.2.1. The future development of UK case law 
 
This approach also enables the courts to go further than Strasbourg. The British courts 
have the possibility to consider pure domestic issues without dealing with the political 
consequences that Strasbourg must take into account having a so much larger field of 
impact. The British courts will gradually, once they start using the Human rights act on a 
day to day basis build up their own case law which will probably develop much faster than 
Strasbourg. However the Convention and its case law will always set the minimum 
standard, a floor below which one cannot fall.  
 
During the parliamentary proceedings of the Bill the Home Secretary stated that it was 
open for domestic law to provide greater protection than that given by the Convention. The 
                                                 
51 T Petitioner v Lord Advocate, 1997 SLT 724. 
52 The Human rights act, A briefing paper for the Scottish judiciary, p 9. 
53 Human Rights Act, Section 2(1). 
54 ECHR, Article 46(1).   
55 Grosz, Human rights, p 7, 1-11. 
 27
Lord Chancellor specifically pointed out that the UK courts where free to develop human 
rights jurisprudence by taking into account European judgements and decisions.56 This was 
made to enable the courts to move out in new directions in the whole sphere of human 
rights law. The Lord Chancellor even stated that “upon occasion it might be appropriate to 
do so, and it is possible that [UK Courts] might give a successful lead to Strasbourg”.57 
 
8.2.2. The Strasbourg Jurisprudence 
 
A court determining a human rights issue, which has arisen during proceedings, must take 
into account judgements, decisions declarations or advisory opinions of the European 
Court of Human rights.58 The UK court has the possibility, because of its more expansive 
approach to the Convention, to apply a more generous Strasbourg ruling even though it has 
in a later decision been narrowed down. This is in line with the determination to evolve the 
UK human rights case law.59 The Human rights act also points out inter alia the Reports 
and the Opinions of the Commission as being significant when it comes to deciding the 
scope of the substantive articles of the Convention.60   
 
8.2.3. Other sources of interpretation 
 
the courts can also develop the Convention case law they may also draw inspiration from 
other treaties and conventions. 
 
The Scotland act gives the Secretary of State for Scotland the power to prohibit the 
implementation of an act which might be incompatible with any international obligation.61 
In this context that means any international agreement which the UK has adhered to other 
than Community law or the Convention rights.62  This power is clearly discretionary, and it 
is only applicable before a bill receives royal assent.  
 
The Convention must not only be interpreted by Strasbourg. As already mentioned the UK 
courts may and shall interpret the Articles to build up British case law. Other jurisdictions 
in the Council of Europe have for a long time applied the Convention. Many of those states 
also apply similar provisions forming part of their own national constitution. Lord Reed, 
judge at the High Court in Edinburgh, stated that decisions emanating from those 
jurisdictions give helpful guidelines concerning similar problems to those facing UK 
Courts.63 But Lord Reed does not stop there. Even Human Rights decisions from outside 
Europe, such as Canada, New Zealand, India, South Africa and the United States, are 
relevant particularly in the absence of a relevant decision from Strasbourg. Decisions from 
the Commonwealth courts will be extra valuable since those countries often have the same 
                                                 
56 Grosz Human Rights p 21. 
57 Hansard, H.L. Vol. 1712, Nov 24,1997, col.835. 
58 Human Rights Act, Section 2(1) (a) 
59 Grosz, p 26. 
60 Human Rights Act, Section 2(1)(b) 
61 Scotland Act, Section 35 (1)(a) 
62 Scotland Act, Section 126(10). 
63 Lord Reed, Human Rights and UK Practice, p 11, How to find Convention law, based on a lecture given at the Faculty of Advocates in Edinburgh 
on 8 May 1999. 
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institutions as in Britain.64 In such cases it will be more difficult to draw inspiration from 
the Civil law countries e.g. when it comes to jury trials.  
 
Since the British Common law system has had such a great influence on other countries the 
British lawyers has a large amount of case law to work with. Especially the interpretation 
of the various charters of rights will be and are used in the Courts.65 The Canadian Charter 
of rights and decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada will most likely be of 
significant importance. 
 
8.3. Declaration of incompatibility 
 
The Scottish Courts has the power to try a case involving a breach of an individual's rights 
based on EC law, the Convention or other human rights instruments and international 
agreements. This power does however only affect Scottish legislation or acts made by an 
official representing the Scottish administration. Therefore it is of procedural importance to 
locate the bases of the claim to see if the court has jurisdiction.  
 
8.3.1. Primary legislation 
 
Unlike Acts of the Scottish Parliament, the Scottish courts have no possibility to strike 
down primary Westminster legislation and a declaration of incompatibility will not affect 
the validity of the provisions in question. This follows from the principle of the 
sovereignty of Parliament. 
Scottish courts shall however interpret Westminster legislation in a way which is 
compatible with Convention rights, as long as it is possible to do so.66 If the Courts find 
that primary Westminster legislation contravenes the Convention they will be able to make 
a declaration of incompatibility.67 The declaration of incompatibility does not affect the 
validity, the continuing operation or enforcement of the operation of the provision. Nor 
does it bind the parties to the proceeding in which it is made. The procedure is rather a 
measure for the Court to signal to the legislators that something is wrong. The expectation 
is that when this occurs the legislators shall amend the actual incompatible legislation 
either by a Bill or via a fast track procedure. The Fast track procedure is a way for the 
Government to rapidly pass a bill through Parliament without the normal procedures and 
time limits. 
 
8.3.2. Subordinate legislation 
 
The Courts will however have the possibility to quash incompatible Westminster 
subordinate legislation as long as its parent statute is in accordance with the Convention. 
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Thus, primary incompatible legislation cannot be healed by changing subordinate 
legislation derived from it. 
  
The effects of this provision are significant since all Acts of the Scottish Parliament are 
subordinate legislation and are therefore open to revocation by the Courts.68 Moreover, an 
Act of the Scottish Parliament is not law in so far as it is outside the legislative competence 
of the Parliament, and legislation which is incompatible with any of the Convention rights 
is outside that competence.69  
 
 
8.4. Concluding remarks 
 
It is important to decide if an act is subordinate ore primary legislation to be able to decide 
which procedure to apply. The possibilities to quash legislation are only directly possible 
concerning subordinate legislation. Here we find the biggest difference compared to EC 
law, which can quash both kinds of legislation. 
 
 
9.  Draft charter of fundamental rights of the European 
Union 
 
The case law emanating from Strasbourg progresses slowly compared to the development 
in the field of Community Law which  expands much faster. It is therefore interesting to 
examine what the future changes in EC law might entail in the field of human rights. 
 
In October 2000, the EU leaders met in Biarritz, France, where they discussed the proposed 
European charter of fundamental rights. The purpose was to try to make the draft 
convention binding on all EU members. The mandate for the creation of the Convention, 
which was the somewhat confusing name which was chosen by the working group, was 
outlined at the Cologne European Council meeting in June 2000. The working group 
consisted of 62 members, both from the EU governments and various parliaments 
including 16 members of the European Parliament. Even the ECJ and the European council 
where represented.70  The task was to create a consolidated charter of the fundamental 
rights applicable at European Union level. One specific objective was also to make those 
rights clear to the Union’s citizens. The charter is based on the European convention on 
human rights, the constitutional traditions of member states and general principles of 
Community law. The Charter also includes the economic and social rights as contained in 
the European Social Charter and the Community Charter of fundamental Social rights of 
workers, insofar they do not merely establish objectives for action by the Union.71  
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The working group had to consider several different issues, especially the raison d’etre for 
the convention was questioned. One argument was that in light of the expansion of the EU, 
a wider all-embracing view of the Charter was necessary. The Charter is an opportunity to 
strengthen the European Union and to enhance the rights of its citizens, and the role of the 
European Parliament. There were also representatives of the opinion that the Charter could 
be construed in such a way that it would regain for member states some of the sovereignty 
they have pooled to the EU.72  The Majority, however, wanted a charter that would at least 
be a protocol of the Treaty and seen to be a legally binding document that covers all 
aspects of European Union activity, including the three pillars. Thus would common 
foreign and security policy, justice and home affairs and institutions such as Europol be 
included.  
 
The most vital decision was however what status the drafted charter would have. The 
Cologne Council decision specifically pointed out that the charter would have no legal 
binding, although it raised the possibility of making it so at a later date. Even though some 
representatives wanted to go further the overall objective was accomplished, to make 
existing rights more visible. 
 
 
9.1. A brief overlook of the EU Charter on Fundamental rights 
 
The Charter is based on the European Convention on Human Rights and the economic and 
social rights as contained in the European Social Charter and the Community Charter of 
fundamental Social rights of workers insofar they do not merely establish objectives for 
action by the Union.73 The language of the draft Charter is clearer and made with the intent 
that everybody, not only lawyers, should be able to read and understand it. Thus the 
Charter is a consolidation of already existing rights. 
The Charter contains 7 chapters and a preamble. The headlines are Dignity, Freedoms, 
Equality, Solidarity, Citizenship, Justice and the final General provisions. Some view the 
charter as being to vague, which lessens the value of the more important rights therein.  
 
The Charter has also been criticised for paving the way to a new European Constitution, 
which would form the backbone in a future European State, but it can also be seen as a way 
to ease the tension between the ECJ and the national courts. 
 
9.2. The Charter and the Convention 
 
One of the most controversial issues concerns the way the European Convention on 
Human rights will fit into the Charter and how consistency can be maintained in 
judgements made by the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human 
rights. If the new charter is enacted the two Courts will have the same jurisdiction in many 
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areas. It also creates problems relating to the vast Case law from Strasbourg and what 
status it will have in the ECJ.  
 
Another view is that the Charter will create a more coherent system of human rights within 
Europe. The Community institutions as well as the member states will follow the Charter 
which would exclude the dual system which exists in Scotland today. The Convention 
would still play an important role in ensuring that the Member states and the institutions 
follow its decisions. This would create two layers of human rights protection, the downside 
is that this could lead to one for the EU, and one for the rest Europe. There is also a risk 
that the Charter could lessen the value of the Convention and the work which has been 
done under that institution.  
 
 
9.3. Implications of the Charter in Britain 
 
The Charter can in theory be used by the ECJ even though it is not legally binding. Instead 
it can be included via 6(2) TEU as a mean of defining, fundamental human rights which 
are protected by the Union. It is very likely that “inspiration” will be drawn from the 
various articles in the Charter. As a matter of fact this has already occurred, when the so 
called “wise men” investigating Austria, referred to the Charter as a source of European 
values.74 But, since the Charter consolidates already existing rights it can also be seen as a 
clarification which does not really change any substantial law. However it will bring up the 
“forgotten” protocols and putting in particular the social rights at the same level as the 
Convention rights. 
 
The Charter further extends the rights which, at least on a theoretical level, create problems 
in the UK. Primarily when it comes to the status and powers of Parliament but it also 
interferes with the present introduction of the Human Rights Act, which becomes to some 
extent a third human rights instrument. 
The possible enactment of the Charter can have a significant effect on Britain in many 
cases. If the ECJ fully uses the possibilities given, there are some scenarios which might 
cause disturbance in the UK. Article 9 of the Charter guarantees the right to marry which 
could mean that the law must recognise gay weddings. Article 21, which bans 
discrimination on religious grounds, could be seen a threat to religious schools. The 
Charter also prohibits reproductive cloning of human beings and making the human body 
and its part a source of financial gain. More important are the workers rights which the 
Conservative party fears will threaten the competitive advantage the UK has over 
especially Germany. These arguments are of course not all of them viable, since there will 
most likely be some kind of mechanism such as the present ”margin of appreciation” in the 
Convention.  
 
The Charter could also be used in a Scottish court as an indication of what is considered to 
be human rights. This can be done either by valuing the charter as a direct definition of EC 
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law or indirect as an important international human rights document which should be 
followed. 
 
This evolution is not likely to happen in the near future. It would be politically very 
difficult for the ECJ to apply the Convention via the back door on its own institutions and 
Member states when it has stated that it does not have the competence to accede to it.75 The 
Court has so far not applied the Charter and all attempts to do so by parties have been 
revoked.76 
 
 
 
10. The relationship between the Convention and EC 
law in Scotland 
 
An upcoming problem in the field of European law is the relation between the European 
Court of Justice in Luxembourg and the European Court of Human rights in Strasbourg. 
The same issues might appear in the Scottish courts i.e. when a case overlaps and deals 
with both a question of Community law and the European Convention on Human rights. 
This relationship is of great importance since the Scottish courts are so closely bound by 
both the Convention and EC law. The difference between EC law and the Convention 
entails, as above mentioned, different procedural rules and possibilities especially when it 
concerns overriding subordinate or primary legislation. 
It is therefore important to analyse how the two legal systems functions together first on a 
European level to see what consequences this might entail in Scotland. 
  
10.1. The European Union and the Convention 
 
The Community’s legislative power has expanded to such a degree that it more and more 
often enters areas where the Convention also is applicable. The need for the Community to 
comply with the ECHR and to define the jurisdiction of the courts in Luxembourg and 
Strasbourg is thus of great importance. The principle that acts of the European Community 
must respect fundamental rights has its origins from the case Stauder v Ulm 77where the 
Court stated that it had interpreted a Community measure in such a way not to prejudice 
fundamental human rights. The Court went even further the following year in 
Internationale HandelsGesellschaft78 there it asserted that the respect for fundamental 
rights inspired by the constitutional traditions of the Member states, formed an integral part 
of the general principles of Community law. In Nold79 the Court stated that international 
human rights treaties was a source of guidelines against which to measure Community law. 
In Rutili80 the Court examined for the first time a specific article of the Convention and has 
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done so ever since in several judgements. In ERT 81 the court stated that the Convention 
has special significance in identifying human rights respected by the Community.  
 
10.1.1 Treaties 
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam further expanded the provisions in the Treaty of the European 
Union focusing on the respect for Human rights. Article 6 of the TEU sets out the key 
human rights principles which the Community must observe. Article 6(2) provides that 
”the Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights an Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 
1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as 
general principles of Community law” 
 
Article 7 TEU makes it possible to suspend certain rights of a member state who 
persistently breaches the basic Human rights principles in article 6. It is however 
questionable how efficient this provision is since the procedures require an unanimous 
decision by the Member States together with a broad consensus in the European 
Parliament. Article 46 TEU empowers the Court to scrutinise the actions of the institutions 
so that they are compatible with the rights in Art 6(2). This provision gives the ECJ the 
power to ensure that the Union’s various institutions follows the Convention even though 
the Union per se is not bound by it. 
 
The Treaty of Nice went even further and called for a European charter of rights.82 The 
status of the charter is still unclear since its legal value was not decided. So far it is only a 
declaration and is not enforceable.  
 
10.1.2. Incitements for the EU to follow the Convention 
 
The European Union is not a signatory to the European Convention of Human Rights, and 
has not the power to do so.83 However the union must respect the fundamental rights 
mentioned in article 6(2) TEU. The present status concerning the relation between an act 
by an EU institution and the ECHR is somewhat unclear. Since the EU has not acceded to 
the Convention those rights cannot be directly be enforced in Strasbourg. Instead the ECJ 
has, as above mentioned, created its own case law interpreting and using the convention as 
a guideline. This was partly done to remedy the democratic deficit and to ease some of the 
criticism from the Member states. 
 
The EU has been, to some extent, forced to comply with the Convention by several 
member states, and is moving progressively towards that goal. The EU’s apparent lack of a 
codified catalogue of fundamental rights caused the German constitutional court to act. 
Since the Union also does not have a democratically elected parliament with scrutinising 
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and legislating powers the German Bundesverfassungsgericht stated in the Solange 
judgement of May 29, 1974, that it was necessary to conduct a secondary review of the 
Community legislation.84 This judgement was later followed by the second solange case in 
1986 where the German Court took the stance towards a conditional acceptance of the 
primacy of Community law. Thus Community law would be followed as long as the case 
law of the ECJ continued to guarantee the observance of fundamental rights.85 This stance 
by the German court further indicated the need for the Union to accede to the Convention. 
The activist attitude inspired Germany to propose the European charter of rights.86  
 
Other Member states such as the UK and Italy, have taken a similar conditional stance as 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht. The ultimatum facing the ECJ and the Community is that if 
they do not follow and respect the fundamental human rights, the national courts do not 
consider them selves as being bound by that decision or legislation. This would entail a 
collapse of the whole system of primacy of EC law. Thus the member states´ national 
courts function as the guardian of fundamental rights and forces the EU to comply with the 
Convention. 
 
10.1.3. ECJ Jurisdiction and Competence 
 
The Court progressively moved EC law into the ECHR field but this development was 
reversed somewhat in the Court’s opinion 2/9487 where the approach to the Convention 
field was summarised. The Court stated that the Community has no competence to enact 
rules on human rights or to conclude international conventions in this field. This 
competence can only be given by the member states. This statement by the Court must be 
read in the light of the criticism it had received by many member states that were of the 
opinion that the Court had gone to far in. 
The Court continued by declaring that it was now well settled that the Community must 
respect fundamental rights as a part of the general principles of law whose observance the 
Court ensures. All Community acts must respect human rights as a condition to be lawful, 
both when it comes to interpretation and validation. The Court thus tried to find a balance 
between the demand for the protection of rights, as demanded in the solange cases, and the 
criticism from member states that thought that the Court hade gone outside its competence. 
 
In Johnston v RUC88 the Court examined the act of a member state and the UK was found 
to have breached the respect for fundamental rights when implementing a Community 
directive. Thus the Court examines the implementation of community legislation and is not 
confined to Community actions only. All national rules that fall within the scope of EC 
law, even though they are not directly implementing Community law, may be scrutinised 
by the Court.  
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In the case Mannesmannröhren89 the Court of first instance stated in a case dealing with 
the right to not incriminate oneself under the Competition law that the Convention was not 
directly applicable but that international documents concerning the protection of human 
rights, notably the Convention, enjoyed the protection of the Community.90 This meant that 
the Convention could not be applied via Community law concerning companies. 
 
10.2. The Interaction between Luxembourg and Strasbourg 
 
There is a significant increase in cases which involve both EC and Human rights issues, 
even though the area of overlap between Community law and the Convention is partial 
because in large measure the two systems pursue different objectives. The ECJ is the 
guardian of the European economic integration and the four freedoms whereas the 
European court safeguards the Convention rights. However, the overlap in jurisdiction may 
involve cases coming before both the ECJ and the Court of Human rights. Alternatively 
two cases concerning similar facts and issues may go separately to Luxembourg and 
Strasbourg. There are even cases which have been considered by both courts on different 
issues which have in fact involved no real overlap. The ECJ found in the Agosi case91 that 
silver coins confiscated by customs were not goods and thus not covered by the EC treaty. 
Strasbourg found on the other hand that the convention was applicable92. Another example 
is the Grogan case93 where the Court avoided the issue finding that the Treaty was not 
applicable when there was no economic link between the providing of service and the 
information given to students concerning abortion possibilities in the UK for Irish 
students.94 The same case went to Strasbourg in Open Door Counselling95 where the court 
found that it did raise a Convention issue.  
 
In Matthews case96 the reverse situation occurred concerning a complaint about the British 
Act concerning elections to the European Parliament which excluded Gibraltar. The 
European Commission of Human rights decided that these elections fell outside the scope 
of the Convention.97 The Court in Strasbourg however, took a different view than the 
Commission. The standpoint not to interfere in the jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Justice was somewhat changed. The Court stated that it cannot challenge the acts of the 
Community because the EU is not a contracting party to the Convention. Then it continued 
by adding that a contracting party’s responsibility under the Convention continues even 
though it has conceded some of its powers to a supranational organisation.98 The 
Convention is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day 
conditions. The mere fact that a body, such as the European parliament, was not envisaged 
by the drafters of the Convention cannot prevent it from being applied.99  The Court found 
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that the Act breached the Convention when it did not make it possible for the people of 
Gibraltar to vote in the election for the European Parliament.  
 
The Judgement in Matthews has been seen, by some authors in the doctrine, as a major 
change in the relationship between the two courts where the European Court had taken the 
lead over the ECJ by striking out Community law.100 This is probably not the case. The 
European court found that the actual provision was an international treaty and not pure 
Community law. Thus, the Court did not rule on Community law, and it is fair to say that 
the two courts still respect each other even if the thin line separating them clearly is 
disappearing. 
 
The Matthews case indicates that the Court of Human rights distinguishes between primary 
and secondary Community law as to the possibility of holding the Member States 
responsible under the Convention for infringements of fundamental rights committed by 
Community institutions.101 The criterion for distinguishing between the two categories lies 
in the possibility to challenge the act in question before the ECJ. Secondary Community 
law can be challenged before the ECJ which can review its compatibility with the 
Convention. According to the M &Co decision, a Member State will incur no 
responsibility under the Convention as long as the international organisation which they 
have set up contains a system of judicial review offering an equivalent protection as the 
Court of human rights can provide.102 The M & Co decision together with the Matthews 
case covers the whole EC range. The Member States cannot ignore the Convention via 
Community legislation, but as long as the ECJ applies the Convention, that protection is 
sufficient in the eyes of the Human rights Court103. 
 
There are also cases where the two systems complement each other. In Hornsby104, the ECJ 
found that two British nationals had the right to teach in Greece, a decision which was later 
enforced by Strasbourg when the Greek Government had failed to comply with the 
judgement.105 
 
Cases before the ECJ, which involves arguments on the compatibility of Community law 
with the Convention, carries the greatest risk for a jurisdictional overlap between the two 
Courts. However there are only a very small number of cases that might show this 
inconsistency. The Orkem106 case and the Solvay107 case might be considered to be 
inconsistent with the Court of Human rights decision in Funke.108 In Orkem the ECJ found 
that the privilege against self-incrimination was not applicable to a Commission decision 
compelling the applicant to give evidence against itself in the field of competition. The 
Court’s line was that this right only applied to persons charged with a criminal offence. 
The Strasbourg court found on the other hand in Funke that for customs to compel the 
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applicant to provide evidence of alleged offences was a breach of Article 6 of the 
Convention.  In this context it appears that Article 6 of the Convention applies to acts by 
the Commission, especially the search and seizure procedures under EC competition law. 
Thus the Orkhem and Solvay case might no longer be regarded as good law.109 
 
 
10.3. The ECJ as an additional enforcer of rights 
 
There might also be situations where the ECJ can enforce rights more efficiently than the 
European Court of Human Rights. The Community law provides for additional 
possibilities. The principle of non-discrimination defined by Article 12 TEU prohibits all 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality.110 Article 13 TEU allows the Community to 
adopt rules to combat discrimination on the grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion 
or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. 
This provision does not have direct effect, but it provides for a legal basis which is 
intended to enable the Council to act.111 Article 141(4) EC allows the Member States to 
adopt measures of positive action to compensate disadvantages between the sexes in 
professional life. A new protocol concerning non-discrimination has however recently been 
added to the Convention which entails that both systems may from now on pursue the 
same goal. 
 
In the field of equal rights the ECJ has ruled in the case Kreil v Germany112 that a 
”blanket” exclusion of women from certain military activities under national law was 
illegal. Properly justified measures for certain military units could however be allowed.113 
In this case the court moved in to a field of Community law which is closely connected to 
the national security of the member states. The Court stated that this area does not fully fall 
outside the scope of Community law and that the principles of proportionality and equal 
treatment for men and women as regards to employment procedures have effect. 
 
From these examples it is not far fetched to draw the conclusion that the two Courts try to 
respect each other’s jurisdiction. The ECJ in particular does not seem to want to apply the 
convention too specifically. The Member states has so far decided not to incorporate the 
Convention into EC law and the Court has stated that the Community has no power under 
the Treaty to do so itself. The Court has however entered the field of Human Rights by 
referring to the member states constitutional traditions and general principles where the 
Convention is in the focal point.  
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10.4. Cases involving both Community law and the Convention 
before Scottish domestic courts 
 
England and Wales implemented the Convention in October 2000.114 Prior that date the 
success of a case involving a Convention point depended on whether a litigant could make 
his claim within the scope of Community law. The litigant must show that his fundamental 
rights protected by the ECJ are infringed and that the case involves a Community law 
point. To do this, the litigant could raise a large number of Community issues to create a 
platform for human rights arguments. Most often, these kinds of tactics could be seen 
through and rejected.  
  
As already mentioned, litigants may now under the Human Rights Act argue convention 
points whether or not Community rights are involved. But when a case involves both 
Community legislation and the Convention the whole issue becomes more difficult. If the 
issues raised do not overlap or conflict with each other the Scottish court will probably first 
examine the Community law points and then to decide the Convention points. The Court 
might also consider making a reference to the ECJ under the procedures in Article 234 of 
the EC Treaty. This scenario is likely since the remedies under Community law are much 
more efficient than those under the Convention. 
 
Within its scope, Community law strikes out any inconsistent national law, even primary 
UK law. Thus it is a more powerful tool for the litigant to use. As stated above the same 
situation only involving a Convention point will lead to the “fast track procedure” and 
cannot strike out primary UK law.115 Subordinate legislation, such as the law emanating 
from the Scottish parliament, will be stricken out directly.  
 
Another possible scenario might occur where a directly applicable Community rule has 
been applied to a litigant so as to breach his Convention rights. The Scottish Court could 
make a declaration of incompatibility which would mean that it would strike down the 
actual Community legislation just as it could strike down any other legislation emanating 
from the Scottish parliament. The solution is however unlikely since it would not deal with 
the real problem. EC law is given domestic effect in the UK via the European 
Communities Act. To strike down that act would be rather artificial since the real problem 
lies in the actual EC law. It is more likely that the court in this instance would make an 
article 234 reference to the ECJ. This would give the court the possibility to ask the ECJ 
whether or not the Community rule breaches the convention and the subsequent question 
of its validity. The problem then lies in the hands of the ECJ. If the case involves a Treaty 
provision it is up to the ECJ to find the right interpretation. So far it is fair to say that the 
ECJ strives very hard not to breach and to avoid a conflicting situation with the 
Convention.  
However if the ECJ declined to amend or annul the Community measure, the litigant 
would have to take the case to Strasbourg. The Court of Human rights would then have to 
examine if the Community provisions breaches the Convention.  
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A more likely scenario is when a national rule which implements Community legislation 
breaches the Convention. The case Johnston v RUC116 illustrates such a situation. In this 
case however, the ECJ settled the matter by referring to the Convention.117 In such a case 
the Scottish court would strike down legislation from the Scottish parliament since it is 
secondary UK legislation and thus ultra vires and make a declaration of incompatibility if 
it was primary UK legislation. This would lead to the above mentioned fast track procedure 
in Westminster.  
 
Before devolution it was necessary to show that there had been a breach of human rights in 
the field of Community law to give the courts the possibility to strike down that legislation 
and to award damages. With the Human rights act it is now possible for a litigant to access 
those Convention rights without founding them on EC legislation. Nevertheless it might 
still be beneficial for a litigant to establish that a Community right is breached together 
with a Convention right. If the case involves secondary legislation there is no difference. 
But, on the other hand, if the case involves primary UK legislation, the act in question will 
only be set a side if it breaches Community law. It is also likely that the award of damages 
will be higher under Community law than under the Convention. The Scottish courts must 
allow effective enforcement under Community law which are more generous than those 
provided under the Convention.118 Strasbourg might give the litigant right but has not the 
same effective enforcement when it comes to awarding damages. Even though the Scottish 
court will rule on the matter it does so initially based on the available case law from 
Strasbourg. Another reason why it might be more efficient to establish a breach of 
Community law is the requirement to exhaust all domestic remedies in the Convention.119 
Thus the Scottish Court may instantly refer the case to the ECJ via Article 234 if it 
involves a Community issue.  
 
10.5. Concluding remarks 
 
The difference between Community legislation and the Convention, especially relating to 
the difference between the accessibility, time frame and remedies comports that the court 
might first be faced with the difficult question of deciding if the case, or parts of the case is 
within the scope of EC law. In the long run this can only be cured by instituting the same 
remedies independent of which set of rules apply. The Judges must be updated concerning 
the development of Community law. It is rather strange that the Convention rights enforced 
via Community law enjoy higher enforceability and thus higher protection. The result 
seems to be that Community law takes precedence over national law, i.e. the Human rights 
act, but the Community legislation must conform to the Convention via the Treaty. 
 
A Scottish national still has the possibility to access both courts, even though the main idea 
is that he should be able to hear his case before a national court.  
 
                                                 
116 Jonston v Chief Constable of Royal Ulster Constabulary , case 222/84. 
117 Steiner, p 109. 
118 See the development emmanating from the case Harz C-17/93. 
119 article 35 of the Convention. 
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To access Strasbourg it is necessary to have exhausted all national remedies. This is a 
procedure, which can take quite some time. The only way to access the ECJ is by making a 
reference via the procedure in article 234. This means that it is up to the national court to 
decide whether or not this shall be made, and not the parties. There is a small possibility 
for an individual to access the court and that is in the rare situation when a decision is of 
direct and individual concern to him.120  
 
In sum, EC legislation strikes out any UK legislation whereas a case tried under the Human 
rights act, thus mainly the Convention, only directly strikes out secondary legislation. It is 
thus important to found a case on EC law or a statute which can be stricken out. The 
continuing changes in EC law is in this aspect of great legal importance. 
 
 
11. Case law involving a devolution issue 
 
The new legislation proved to be very popular amongst lawyers, over 400 challenges has 
so far been made, even though only some ten has been successful. Both old and new 
legislation has been put up to the test. As a matter of fact the first legislation passed by the 
new Scottish Parliament was the Mental Health Act, an emergency legislation passed to 
cover a loophole in the existing act.121 
By analysing the few cases which has so far emerged from the Scottish courts one can see 
how the Scottish judges deals with devolution in practice and how the ECHR as a living 
instrument is used by a common law lawyer.  
 
11.1. Temporary Sheriffs 
 
One of the first devolution issues in a criminal case emerged in Starrs and Chalmers. This 
case is therefore analysed more thoroughly to explain how the Scottish court approaches a 
devolution issue. The accused argued that they were not entitled to a fair trial under article 
6 of the Convention since the Sheriff was not independent from the prosecutors and the 
Government. The case would have huge implications for the judiciary since Temporary 
sheriffs handled almost 25% of the total workload in the Scottish Courts. 
 
On 5 May 1999 the complainers Hugh Latta Starrs and James Wilson Chalmers appeared 
for trial before temporary Sheriff Crowe in Linlithgow Sheriff Court on a summary 
complaint. The case was for practical reasons reallocated before Temporary Sheriff 
Alexander who allowed the accused to raise a so called devolution issue under the rules of 
the Act of Adjournal even though the accused had not done so in their original minute.122 
Temp Sheriff Crowe repelled that decision on 30 July and thus refused the accused to 
adjust their minute. Starrs and Chalmers presented their bills of advocation seeking to 
                                                 
120 article 230 TEU.  
121 Ruddle, a patient at Carstairs, a high security mental institution, was released because he was considered by doctors to be incurable. The old act        
read together with the Convention stated meant that he could not be locked up since that would violate his human rights.  
122 Devolution issues rules 40.5, p 3 opinion of the Lord Justice Clerk. 
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overrule the decision of 30 July. The Procurator fiscal challenged the decision of Sheriff 
Alexander of letting a devolution issue being raised. 
 
The case thus came before the Appeal court, High court of Justiciary, in Edinburgh. The 
Solicitor General acted as prosecutor representing the Lord Advocate. Before the key issue 
was dealt with the Court had to clarify what relation the Lord Advocate had with the 
procurator fiscal and what the meaning of “act” was under section 57(2) of the Scotland 
Act. One of the difficulties is the somewhat dual situation in which the Lord Advocate 
operates. He is not only head of the judiciary and thus the prosecution service but he also 
takes part in the Scottish Executive.123 The Court found that when the procurator fiscal 
continued the prosecution it constituted an act of the Lord Advocate since they were both 
bound by the Convention.124 Thus section 57(2) of the Scotland Act applied. 
 
11.1.1. Legal reasoning 
 
The Court then moved to the main issue namely whether a temporary Sheriff was an 
independent and impartial tribunal in the sense of Article 6(1) of the Convention which 
provides. 
 
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against 
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law…” 
 
The European Court of Human Rights stated in the case Findlay v UK.125  
 
“ In order to establish whether a tribunal can be considered as ‘independent’, regard must 
be had inter alia to the manner of appointment of its members and their term of office, the 
existence of guarantees against outside pressures and the question whether the body 
presents an appearance of independence. As to the question of ‘impartiality’, there are two 
aspects to this requirement. First, the tribunal must be subjectively free of personal 
prejudice or bias. Secondly, it must also be impartial from an objective viewpoint, that is, it 
must offer sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect.”  
 
Thus when deciding if a tribunal is independent it is vital to find if it presents the 
appearance of independence from an objective standpoint.  The court also pointed out in 
this context the case De Cubber v Belgium.126  In Cubber the Court stated that Article 6(1) 
of the Convention should not be interpreted restrictive in this particular context due to the 
fundamental importance of the right to a fair trial. In Findlay v United Kingdom the Court 
found such objective justification for doubts as to the independence and impartiability of 
the members of a court martial where they were subordinate to the convening officer who 
acted as the prosecutor. The process of review did not prove an adequate guarantee in that 
case.  
                                                 
123 This was due to old parliamentary traditions. 
124 Starrs, p 4 .   
125 Findlay v UK ((1997) 24 E.H.R.R. 221 para 73)  
126 De Cubber v Belgium (1984) 7 E.H.R.R. 326. 
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When deciding if a tribunal is independent and impartial the Court found that the security 
of tenure was of great importance when deciding the impartiality of the judge.  
 
The Court moved to examine how the system of temporary Sheriffs worked. The present 
system was introduced by the enactment of section 11 in the 1971 Sheriff Court Act. The 
idea was to have a pool of Sheriffs who could deal with temporary backlogs on a part time 
basis. The Sheriffs would be paid per day and a minimum number of working days per 
year would also be required. This system allowed solicitors and advocates to be employed 
as temporary sheriffs when the permanent sheriff was ill or when it was a seasonal bulge in 
cases that had to be tried. The appointment would also give experience for those who 
hoped to become permanent sheriffs one day.127 Thus becoming a temporary Sheriff was 
almost a requirement in becoming a permanent Sheriff. 
 
The commission for the temporary sheriff was one year at a time and was formally in the 
hands of the government, but since the Lord Advocate is the first minister’s legal adviser, 
the power was in reality at his pleasure. This meant that the Lord Advocate had a crucial 
role in deciding who should be appointed to become a temporary sheriff and later on who 
should be given a permanent position, when he recommends that person.  
The Court found that the one-year commission was not enough to satisfy the requirements 
under the Convention. The one-year period per se was not the crucial factor it was the way 
the period worked. The Sheriff could just be not re-appointed without stating any real 
reason since the job was of a temporary character. There was also the opportunity to not 
give the judge any assignments during his year, which would lead to the same effect as a 
discharge.128 In the light of this scenario however theoretical the sheriffs lacked clearly in 
“security of tenure” which was one of the requirements in being independent. 
 
Primarily article 12 of the UN general assembly resolution from 1985 relating to the basic 
principles on the independence of the judiciary, which states inter alia that there shall be a 
guaranteed tenure where also considered. Counsel for the defendant also drew the Courts 
attention to the Latimer House Guidelines of the Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Association of the 19th June 1998 which state: “judicial appointments should normally be 
permanent; whilst in some jurisdictions contract appointments may be inevitable, such 
appointments should be subject to appropriate security of tenure”. The court also examined 
other international guidelines and definitions on the independence of the judiciary. The 
Canadian charter of rights was examined together with its case law which clearly supported 
the Court’s reasoning. 
The Court further found that the system with temporary sheriffs had created two categories 
of judges. One, which could be fired at will and one, which was permanent. It could also 
give rise to the perception that the former was inferior in quality.  In the light of the 
importance to keep an appearance of independence this could not be accepted.  
 
The Lord Advocate plays a vital part in appointing new judges. He is also a part of the 
Executive and thus responsible for the prosecution service in Scotland together with the 
                                                 
127 Opinion Lord Justice Clerk, p 8 referring to baroness Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie House of Lords cols 883-885. 
128 Opinion of Lord Clerk, p 15. 
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solicitor General. The fact that the same person leads the prosecution and appoints the 
judges cannot comply with the Convention. This leads to ascertain if there is a risk that 
justice might not be done, or be seen not to be done. 
 
The Court also found that it was highly questionable that the court should in any way be or 
be perceived to be inter linked with the Executive, especially when the Executive takes part 
in the case. The Court here referred to a Norwegian case129 where a decision made by a 
temporary judge was set aside in litigation against the state. The reasons where, that in 
terms of a statutory provision he was “incompetent” because there were particular 
circumstances which were “liable to undermine confidence in his impartiality”. The Court 
further concluded that there is such a real risk that a well-informed observer might think 
that a temporary judge might be influenced by his hopes and fears to his perspective 
advancement.130 
 
11.1.2. Conclusion 
 
In Starrs the court interprets the Convention in the light of similar international 
conventions and other countries’ case law. Concerning the Norwegian case, the Court 
states in its opinion that foreign law has no direct value in a Scottish court but nevertheless 
the case was taken into account in the court’s judgement and legal reasoning. The court 
thus uses the full extent of the possibilities given in the Human rights Act. 
 
The Executive’s representatives and the prosecutor did also give the complainers the 
possibility to raise a devolution issue. Under the Scottish procedural Court rules they could 
have argues much harder that the devolution issue could not be raised, but it appears that 
all parties wanted to try the scope of the new Scotland act and the vires of devolution. 
 
 
11.2. Temporary Judges 
 
The Inner house of the Court of Session gave on April 4 2000 its opinion on a devolution 
issue raised before a temporary judge in the civil contract case, Paul Clancy v. Robin 
Dempsey Caird. The original case concerned a claim for damages for an alleged breach of 
contract in respect of the sale of a nursing home. The case was handled by TG Couts, Q.C. 
sitting as a temporary judge. During the initial stages of the trial the decision in Chalmers 
v. Starrs was published and the parties were given the opportunity consider their position 
in light of that ruling. In this context the pursuer objected that the hearing before a 
temporary Judge was in breach of Article 6 of the Convention and that the judge thus was 
incompetent. The Judge, Mr Couts, took the view that it was inappropriate for him to 
consider the issue and referred the case to the Inner house of the Court of Session. 
 
                                                 
129 Plahte v Norska staten, 19 Dec 1997. 
130 Starrs, p 41. 
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11.2.1. The Devolution issue 
 
The Court first had to consider whether a failure to act in accordance with the Convention 
rights by the Scottish ministers fell within the provisions of the Scotland Act 1998. The 
Court found that it would be strange if the provisional application of the convention under 
article 129(2) of the Scotland Act only applied to a direct breach. To make the law as clear 
as possible and to remove any ambiguities concerning the definition of the word “act”, the 
Court ruled that the definition contains both an act and a failure to act.  
 
As in the case Chalmers v Starrs the principal issue concerned Article 6.1 of the 
Convention and the Court had in the same way to interpret the meaning of the phrase 
“independent and impartial”.131 A substantial number of European and Canadian cases 
were referred to the Court together with the recent case Chalmers and Starrs. 
 
Faced with this great number of different cases from various jurisdictions the Court 
continued by examining their status in Scots law. Decisions, made by the Court of Human 
rights and the Commission, are not treated in the same way as Scottish precedents. The 
principles which can be drawn from those decisions are on the other hand more relevant, 
and they should be applied. It is clear from the decisions emanating from Strasbourg that 
the decision in any particular case will depend upon the particular facts and circumstances 
of that case considered in the context of the legal system of the state concerned. The 
general principles found will remain constant but their application will vary depending on 
the particular facts and circumstances of that case. The Court then analyses relevant 
European and Canadian Case law to extract these principles in the light of the precedent 
decision in Starrs. 
 
The Court’s approach was to find the relevant principles in the ECHR cases, then to look at 
the Canadian charter to find additional assistance. Lastly the Court would examine the 
Starrs case. One of the judges, Lord Coulsfield, was of the opinion that very many cases 
that they where referred to where of little or no assistance. His opinion differs somewhat 
from the one given by the Court in Starrs, and maybe he tries to lessen the direct 
implications of foreign influence to some extent. After excluding several cases Lord 
Coulsfield moved to point out two similar cases, one decision by the Commission of 
Human rights Stieringer v Germany132 and the Norwegian Supreme Court case Plahte133. 
The Court here applies two cases which deal with the same issue. Thus they consider 
similar cases even though at least the Norwegian case stems from a very different 
jurisdiction. Lord Coulsfield comments the use of the two cases “It seems to me that these 
two decisions are useful illustrations of the kind of reasoning which has to be applied in a 
case like this, in conformity with general principles of the Convention.”134 
 
The Court did however find, using basically the same grounds as in Starrs, that the system 
of Temporary Judges differed compared with the system of Temporary Sheriffs. The 
                                                 
131 Opinion of Lord Sutherland, p 2. 
132 Stieringer v Germany, (1996) Appl.no.28899/95 
133 Plahte v Norway, p 26. 
134 Clancy, para. 27. 
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Temporary Judges has a security of tenure during their appointment. Thus the system with 
temporary judges was in compliance with the Convention. 
 
11.3. Brown v Stott 
 
In the Case Brown v Stott article 6 of the Convention was applied again.135 The High Court 
held that the right to a fair trial and the consequent right to silence and right against self-
incrimination, was breached by the Road traffic act 1998. The act stated that it was an 
offence for the keeper of a motor vehicle to fail to give information to the police when 
required to do so as to the identity of the driver. The implications of this ruling could mean 
that the way the police worked by using automatic speed cameras was unlawful. One of the 
judges, Lord Rodger made an obiter comment that it would be difficult to apply article 6 
on this practise. 
However, the case was later overruled on appeal by the Privy Council. This was possible 
since the act in question involved a British Statute, which means that it can be referred to 
the Privy Council. 
 
11.4. Gayne v Vannet 
 
As mentioned, very few devolution claims have been successful. In Gayne v Vannet the 
accused argued that his right to effective representation under article 6(3) of the 
Convention was breached. The accused was limited to a fixed amount of legal aid (£500) 
that covered only the first 30 minutes of his trial. The Executive had as a measure to 
control the money spent on legal aid decided to introduce a fix sum which would be given 
regardless of the initial cost. (If the proceedings continued more than this time, additional 
funding would be provided) The accused based his argument on that the right to sufficient 
legal aid was a basic civil right which must be protected. The Appeal Court stated that it is 
within the state’s margin of appreciation to decide how to distribute the resources available 
for legal aid. The court found that the arguments put forward by the accused as being 
speculative. Further the accused had failed to show that there had been an unfairness. 136 
 
11.5. McLean 
 
In the Mclean case137 a similar question as in Gayne was raised. The accused argued that 
the fixed fees under the legal aid system limited his lawyers in doing a sufficiently good 
job. The main topic concerned the ”inequality of arms”, a principle protected by Article 
6(3)(b) of the Convention. Since the prosecutor did have unlimited resources the court 
found that the legal aid system with fixed fees breached the Convention in this aspect and 
had to be changed. 
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11.6. Conclusions from the case law 
 
It is difficult to draw any wider conclusions from the case law which has emerged so far. 
There are still not enough cases to study to make any certain remarks. However some 
interesting features can be found. 
 
The court in Starrs and in Clancy did not only consider the Convention but also many 
other international and foreign human rights instruments. In both cases the Court even 
referred to a Norwegian Supreme Court case. Even though the court did not directly apply 
the Norwegian case law it was one of the most persuasive arguments which was made 
during the trial. This was somewhat of a surprise for the Scottish legal community since 
Norwegian law has very little connection with the British. 
 
The Court in Clancy seemed to take a more careful approach to directly referring to foreign 
cases than the Court in Starrs did. Maybe some of the judges were of the opinion that the 
Court in Starrs had gone to far. However the Clancy case clearly pointed out that the 
principles found in foreign case law dealing with similar situations was of significance. 
 
There is a strong indication that the Scottish courts will be influenced by the level of 
protection enjoyed in other jurisdictions. The courts seems to take great interest in if a 
similar case has been tried before another court, which would give an indication of to 
which extent such rights should be protected. This would entail that the Scottish courts to a 
large extent will not sink below that “international” level of human rights protection. The 
argument seems to be that there is no reason why the Scots should not enjoy the same level 
of protection as an individual in another country. 
 
The courts also apply a proportionality test to see if exceptions can be made. The test is 
similar to the “margin of appreciation” found in the Convention case law.  In Starrs no 
exception could be given even though all the temporary Sheriffs would be removed. In 
Brown v Stott the provisions where upheld, but only after the case had been appealed to the 
Privy Council. Thus it was a British court and not a Scottish court that finally ruled on the 
matter.  
 
In Gayne v Vannet the Court did conclude that there are limits to what can be demanded. 
Here the Court did apply a proportionality test, but it also added that the case was 
speculative and thus without any real basis.138 In Mclean the Court handled, as above 
mentioned, almost the same issue but came to another conclusion. The similarities between 
the two cases are clear so to some extent these cases set out how far the courts will go so 
far.  
 
Most succesful cases have handled the right to a fair trial and especially the role of the 
judges. Article 6 of the Convention has been used in more Scottish cases. In Hoekstra139 
                                                 
138 During the trial many within the legal community were of the opinion that the case was argued by the law firm more to ensure that the firms 
would be properly paid by the legal system than to acctually defend the accused. 
139 Hoekstra v HM Advocate (No3) 2000 GWD 12-417. 
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the appeal court bench was disqualified due to statements by one of its members which 
could give the impression of bias.  
 
So far no legislation has been stricken out under EC legislation. All attempts to use EC law 
has been ruled out as not applicable. This is however not surprising since Community law 
has been enforced for a much longer time in Scotland. 
 
Some of the cases raised contained pretty much all the articles in the Convention together 
with every possible Community point, which could help the lawyer in his case against the 
government. This showed that there was a great uncertainty amongst the lawyers how these 
issues should be handled. The Courts and the Executive’s legal staff however dealt with all 
of these issues and answered all of the points made even though they some times seemed to 
me to be completely irrelevant. But there was a need for everyone to thoroughly sort these 
issues out. All the initial work would be helpful in creating a way to handle the future 
proceedings. In this context it must also be pointed out that the judiciary in no way tried to 
limit the scope of the incorporated legislation. Instead it was rather given a wide 
interpretation and influences were taken from other jurisdiction, such as the 
Commonwealth and other European countries which had already dealt with the same type 
of cases. 
 
11.7. Criticism and reactions 
 
After the decision in Starrs the Scottish judiciary came under a lot of pressure. The 
criticism was hard both from the press and from the Parliament. The ruling in Starrs took 
the legal community and particularly the Executive, somewhat by surprise even though it 
was well known that the system with temporary sheriffs probably would not stand up to the 
standards set by the Convention. The Judiciary had to take interim measures to cope with 
the fact that all 126 temporary Sheriffs no longer had a source of income and the work they 
had done now had to be done by the permanent Sheriffs. Criminal cases had to be 
prioritised, due to the time limits in those proceedings, and civil cases would have to wait, 
with the risk of growing huge back logs. The Judiciary further appointed ten new 
permanent sheriffs to deal with the caseload and increased the working hours for the staff.  
 
In the Scottish Parliament the criticism was harsh. The whole relationship between Scots 
law and the Convention came in focus. One member stated  
 
“We have been the guinea pigs on which the Government’s theories about how best to 
protect human rights in the UK were tested” 140 
 
The criticism never concerned a possible withdrawal from the Convention, it focused on 
the way the implementation was done. Scotland had enforced the Convention before the 
rest of the UK, and had done so in different way than Whitehall.141 The UK Government 
could learn valuable lessons from the Scottish experiment.142 Whitehall had, as mentioned 
                                                 
140 David McLetchie, Con, 2 March 2000 Scottish Parliament Official report, Col 302. 
141 This was done via Section 129 Scotland Act. 
142 Which for some people was seen as a version of the “poll tax”. 
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above, also created the system with the fast track procedure which gives the legislators 
more time to deal with tricky issues. It is however clear that that procedure only concerns 
primary legislation which means that England and Wales might be facing the same 
difficulties as Scotland. 
 
The Executive also faced extensive criticism for not preparing themselves and the 
Judiciary enough. Especially the scrutinising process before a Bill becomes an Act was 
criticised together with the Executives stance to wait for challenges instead of avoiding 
them.143 It is safe to say that the Executive had not expected that the floodgates would 
open. Over 400 claims have so far been made relating to the Convention, even though only 
some ten has been successful. But nevertheless, this was not in any way anticipated, in fact 
Donald Dewar144 stated:  
 
“I am not terribly impressed …with the idea that suddenly the floodgates will open, when 
no one can point me to any single change other than the forum in which the cases may be 
heard that will result from the Bill” 145 
 
 
12. Concluding remarks 
 
The devolution settlement changed many things for the Scottish judiciary. The lawyers and 
the Judges had to deal with these changes in order to make the devolution settlement 
function as smoothly as possible. The Scotland Act did not only affect the judiciary but 
also the scottish people who saw their new parliament start working and the start of a new 
era for Scotland. 
 
12.1. Legal aspects of devolution in Scotland 
 
So far most devolution cases have involved article 6 of the Convention. Lawyers are 
creative and will find other areas as well, which will further develop Scots law in this area. 
Other articles of the Convention will be examined and used. The already existing Scottish 
case law will also be used as a basis for further claims. 
 
It is not strange that most cases involved a breach of the Convention and not EC law. EC 
law has been applied to all legislation since the UK joined the European Union. The 
Convention has not been applied in very many cases prior to devolution so there were 
plenty of areas which could be tried. 
 
EC law will probably be used to a further extent in the near future. As the case law shows, 
EC law provides protection in many areas notably in the area of sex discrimination. The 
basic EC principles may also be used such as the principle of proportionality and the four 
                                                 
143 Roseanna Cunningham Official report of the Scottish Parliament, Thursday 15 June 2000, Col 317. 
144 Secretary of state for Scotland at the time, later Scotland’s First Minister until he passed away. 
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freedoms. Community law is not limited to Euro-defences and has the capacity to prescribe 
and prevent enforcement on a national level.146 The EC legislation will probably appear to 
be more accessible since the Scotland act makes a direct reference to Community law and 
nothing prevents a Scottish judge from applying and interpreting the law even though the 
ECJ might not be able to make that decision. A Scottish Court is not bound by political 
considerations in the same way as the ECJ. The Charter will also entail legal basis for cases 
as soon as its legal status is decided. However it can be used in a Scottish court as a way to 
define rights. The principles derived from the Charter can be used in line with the ruling in 
Starrs and Clancy. Thus, the line separating EC law and the Convention will be 
increasingly important as the Scottish practitioners try to find new legal grounds for their 
claims. 
 
Further, the UN charter can also be used as a source to define rights together with other 
statements made by the UN institutions. As seen in the temporary Sheriffs case the court 
takes a large number of different documents under consideration, even though their legal 
value differs. 
 
It is certain that Scottish practitioners follow the development in other countries to see how 
far they have gone in the development of their national human right case law. As 
mentioned, a foreign case could persuade the court to follow in the same lane. In this 
context the Internet has been of great use to find applicable updated case law. One of the 
more striking examples of the use of Internet occurred during the Mclean trial when the 
Sheriff asked the parties how they interpreted a case posted on the web the same morning. 
It is fair to say that the question took the parties somewhat by surprise. 
 
It is also clear from the Scottish case law that as soon as one case has been successful 
others will follow the same route. This is what the Executive fears. As soon as the first 
case is won concerning e.g. the Charter, lawyers will quickly use that case law in other 
cases. It is therefore important for the Government not to loose those “flood-gate” cases. 
 
The present evolution requires that the lawyers and the judges know a great deal about the 
Convention and that they have the opportunity to stay updated with the new case law. This 
even comports case law from other jurisdictions than the British. The possibility to 
research through the Internet will be more and more important. If a similar decision already 
has been made somewhere in Europe or in other relevant jurisdictions that case might be 
vital for how the actual case turns out. 
 
As a whole, the incorporation of the Convention into Scottish law makes sense. It seems 
rather artificial to try to interpret legislation in a way so it conforms with the Convention, 
as was done prior to devolution. It is more visible to make a direct reference, as was later 
done in the Scotland act. The same goes for Community law. However, the Scottish 
judiciary was not prepared enough for the floodgates to open. But even though the 
Government has faced much criticism it is fascinating that the politicians and the judiciary 
still encourage the courts to develop the national case law. The court can, and shall, go 
further.  
                                                 
146 Boch, Christine, EC law in the UK, p 194.  
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12.2. The devolution settlement 
 
Even though the devolution settlement shaped a Scottish Parliament it is most likely that 
Scotland will remain within the UK. The benefits of belonging to the UK are still great and 
it would for most Scots be strange to have a totally separate nation. Within the UK, 
Scotland takes part in one of the most powerful nations in Europe. This means that 
Scotland can affect especially EC legislation in a much more influential way than if it were 
to be a small country of its own. Further, if Scotland would become independent, it is 
difficult to see that the EU would support this, since it would interfere with the ongoing 
expansion eastwards, and call for a changement of the Treaties. 
 
However, it is important that the UK government co-operates with the Scottish Executive 
in all matters regarding Scotland. The small differences between Scottish and English law 
often creates problems since Whitehall often is not aware of them. On occasion, this causes 
irritation and unnecessary problems. Since London does not know about the differences, 
they might make laws, secondary or primary, which cause unnecessary difficulties for the 
administration. In the long run this might also lead to a demand for further devolution 
 
On the political arena it appears that all problems relating to devolution can be blamed on 
“not enough devolution”, which would call for more devolution. This concern can be seen 
in many of the constructions that have been chosen, notably the Scottish Grand Committee 
and the lover levels of co-operation between the Parliament and the Executive. 
 
There is a need to in the near future adjust the various systems in Scotland. Today the 
procedure differs depending if the matter involves a devolved or a reserved area, 
Community law or the Convention. It would make sense find common solutions to the 
same problems. This would remove many of the vague areas that are present today. 
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13 Appendix 
 
13.1. The Author 
 
In august 1999 I had the opportunity to work as an intern at the Office for the Solicitor to 
the Scottish Executive situated at Victoria Quay in Edinburgh. During the five months that 
followed in division A, the department which deals with all legal issues concerning EC law 
and Human Rights, I got an insight in how the Scots handle the devolution settlement. I 
also spent one month at the Office for the Advocate General which is the UK 
representative for Scotland which handles the reserved areas. 
 
During my time at the office I also took part in different cases before the Scottish courts 
involving both Community law and the Convention. Of particular interest was the way that 
the Scottish Courts handled these new very difficult legal issues. It seemed to me that the 
judiciary was well prepared and very motivated in making the devolution work, even 
though it caused a lot of problems and concern. This will to make devolution work 
amongst the lawyers was the reason why devolution worked out so well. 
 
I also spent a month at the office for the legal adviser to the Scottish Parliament where I 
was able to get an insight from the legislating point of view. The workload facing the 
lawyers at the Parliament was immense but they still strived to make devolution work. 
 
Much of the information on which I have based this paper, is gathered through my own 
work and through everyday discussions with the staff at the different offices. Some of the 
more subjective remarks I have made in the paper are of course affected by my own 
personal opinion and they do not signify the tacit will of the Executive.  
 
I found it fascinating to work in Scotland during the initial stages of devolution. There 
were so many new legal aspects to consider especially involving how the Convention and 
the Community legislation would function together. I believe that this open minded 
approach to human rights law is something that will grow even in other European countries 
and that there are many lessons and examples to learn from emanating from the Scottish 
devolution. 
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13.2. Selected sections of the Scotland Act 
 
 
29. - (1) An Act of the Scottish Parliament is not law so far as any provision of the Act is 
outside the legislative competence of the Parliament. 
 
 (2) A provision is outside that competence so far as any of the following paragraphs 
apply-  
 
(a) it would form part of the law of a country or territory other than Scotland, or 
confer or remove functions exercisable otherwise than in or as regards Scotland, 
 
(b) it relates to reserved matters, 
 
(c) it is in breach of the restrictions in Schedule 4, 
 
(d) it is incompatible with any of the Convention rights or with Community law, 
 
(e) it would remove the Lord Advocate from his position as head of the systems 
of criminal prosecution and investigation of deaths in Scotland 
 
(3) For the purposes of this section, the question whether a provision of an Act of the 
Scottish Parliament relates to a reserved matter is to be determined, subject to subsection 
(4), by reference to the purpose of the provision, having regard (among other things) to its 
effect in all the circumstances. 
 
(4) A provision which- 
 
(a) would otherwise not relate to reserved matters, but 
 
(b) makes modifications of Scots private law, or Scots criminal law, as it applies 
to reserved matters 
is to be treated as relating to reserved matters unless the purpose of the provision 
is to make the law in question apply consistently to reserved matters and 
otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    57. - (1) Despite the transfer to the Scottish Ministers by virtue of section 53 of 
functions in relation to observing and implementing obligations under Community law, 
any function of a Minister of the Crown in relation to any matter shall continue to be 
exercisable by him as regards Scotland for the purposes specified in section 2(2) of the 
European Communities Act 1972. 
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     (2) A member of the Scottish Executive has no power to make any subordinate 
legislation, or to do any other act, so far as the legislation or act is incompatible with any of 
the Convention rights or with Community law. 
 
     (3) Subsection (2) does not apply to an act of the Lord Advocate-  
 
(a) in prosecuting any offence, or 
 
(b) in his capacity as head of the systems of criminal prosecution and 
investigation of deaths in Scotland 
 
which, because of subsection (2) of section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, is not 
unlawful under subsection (1) of that section. 
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